config: disable CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS by xypron · Pull Request #7 · starfive-tech/linux

xypron · 2021-05-04T10:37:33Z

Building bindeb-pkg and binrpm-pgk fails at least on Debian Bullseye when
both module signing and module compression are enabled. The signing step
is executed after compression but expects uncompressed modules:

At main.c:291:

SSL error:02001002:system library:fopen:No such file or directory: ../crypto/bio/bss_file.c:69
SSL error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO_new_file:no such file: ../crypto/bio/bss_file.c:76
sign-file: debian/linux-image/lib/modules/5.10.6+/kernel/crypto/adiantum.ko: No such file or directory
SIGN [M] debian/linux-image/lib/modules/5.10.6+/kernel/crypto/async_tx/async_raid6_recov.ko

Disabling CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS solves the issue.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt xypron.glpk@gmx.de

Building bindeb-pkg and binrpm-pgk fails at least on Debian Bullseye when both module signing and module compression are enabled. The signing step is executed after compression but expects uncompressed modules: At main.c:291: - SSL error:02001002:system library:fopen:No such file or directory: ../crypto/bio/bss_file.c:69 - SSL error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO_new_file:no such file: ../crypto/bio/bss_file.c:76 sign-file: debian/linux-image/lib/modules/5.10.6+/kernel/crypto/adiantum.ko: No such file or directory SIGN [M] debian/linux-image/lib/modules/5.10.6+/kernel/crypto/async_tx/async_raid6_recov.ko Disabling CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS solves the issue. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>

pdp7 · 2021-05-04T20:07:06Z

Thank you I will followup with @tekkamanninja when he is back from holiday and we will get this merged

xypron · 2021-05-04T21:38:40Z

This pull request will solve the build issue now. I assume the upstream build system should be fixed too to encompass both signing and compression. But that would not be part of this board bring up.

pdp7 · 2021-05-07T18:52:08Z

@xypron thank you

commit 44200f2 upstream. Debian's clang carries a patch that makes the default FPU mode 'vfp3-d16' instead of 'neon' for 'armv7-a' to avoid generating NEON instructions on hardware that does not support them: https://salsa.debian.org/pkg-llvm-team/llvm-toolchain/-/raw/5a61ca6f21b4ad8c6ac4970e5ea5a7b5b4486d22/debian/patches/clang-arm-default-vfp3-on-armv7a.patch https://bugs.debian.org/841474 https://bugs.debian.org/842142 https://bugs.debian.org/914268 This results in the following build error when clang's integrated assembler is used because the '.arch' directive overrides the '.fpu' directive: arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-core.S:25:2: error: instruction requires: NEON vmov.i32 q0, #1 ^ arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-core.S:26:2: error: instruction requires: NEON vshr.u64 q1, q0, #7 ^ arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-core.S:27:2: error: instruction requires: NEON vshr.u64 q0, q0, #8 ^ arch/arm/crypto/curve25519-core.S:28:2: error: instruction requires: NEON vmov.i32 d4, #19 ^ Shuffle the order of the '.arch' and '.fpu' directives so that the code builds regardless of the default FPU mode. This has been tested against both clang with and without Debian's patch and GCC. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d8f1308 ("crypto: arm/curve25519 - wire up NEON implementation") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/continuous-integration2/issues/118 Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: Jessica Clarke <jrtc27@jrtc27.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ASan reported a memory leak caused by info_linear not being deallocated. The info_linear was allocated during in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog(). This patch adds the corresponding free() when bpf_prog_info_node is freed in perf_env__purge_bpf(). $ sudo ./perf record -- sleep 5 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.025 MB perf.data (8 samples) ] ================================================================= ==297735==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 7688 byte(s) in 19 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4f420f in malloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f420f) #1 0xc06a74 in bpf_program__get_prog_info_linear /home/user/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c:11113:16 #2 0xb426fe in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:191:16 #3 0xb42008 in perf_event__synthesize_bpf_events /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:410:9 #4 0x594596 in record__synthesize /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1490:8 #5 0x58c9ac in __cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1798:8 #6 0x58990b in cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2901:8 #7 0x7b2a20 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11 #8 0x7b12ff in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8 #9 0x7b2583 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2 #10 0x7b0d79 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3 #11 0x7fa357ef6b74 in __libc_start_main /usr/src/debug/glibc-2.33-8.fc34.x86_64/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16 Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210602224024.300485-1-rickyman7@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

…ed_mmio BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000c03a2500 by task syz-executor083/4269 CPU: 5 PID: 4269 Comm: syz-executor083 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline] kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Allocated by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475 kmem_cache_alloc_trace include/linux/slab.h:450 [inline] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio+0x78/0x1cc arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:146 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x7e8/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3746 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Freed by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline] kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124 coalesced_mmio_destructor+0x94/0xa4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:102 kvm_iodevice_destructor include/kvm/iodev.h:61 [inline] kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev+0x248/0x280 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4374 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x158/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:186 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 If kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev() return -ENOMEM, we already call kvm_iodevice_destructor() inside this function to delete 'struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev' from list and free the dev, but kvm_iodevice_destructor() is called again, it will lead the above issue. Let's check the the return value of kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(), only call kvm_iodevice_destructor() if the return value is 0. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20210626070304.143456-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5d3c4c7 ("KVM: Stop looking for coalesced MMIO zones if the bus is destroyed", 2021-04-20) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

…ed_mmio commit 23fa2e4 upstream. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000c03a2500 by task syz-executor083/4269 CPU: 5 PID: 4269 Comm: syz-executor083 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline] kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Allocated by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475 kmem_cache_alloc_trace include/linux/slab.h:450 [inline] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio+0x78/0x1cc arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:146 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x7e8/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3746 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Freed by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline] kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124 coalesced_mmio_destructor+0x94/0xa4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:102 kvm_iodevice_destructor include/kvm/iodev.h:61 [inline] kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev+0x248/0x280 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4374 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x158/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:186 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 If kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev() return -ENOMEM, we already call kvm_iodevice_destructor() inside this function to delete 'struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev' from list and free the dev, but kvm_iodevice_destructor() is called again, it will lead the above issue. Let's check the the return value of kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(), only call kvm_iodevice_destructor() if the return value is 0. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20210626070304.143456-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5d3c4c7 ("KVM: Stop looking for coalesced MMIO zones if the bus is destroyed", 2021-04-20) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Commit b10d6bc ("arch, drivers: replace for_each_membock() with for_each_mem_range()") didn't take into account that when there is movable_node parameter in the kernel command line, for_each_mem_range() would skip ranges marked with MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG. The page table setup code in POWER uses for_each_mem_range() to create the linear mapping of the physical memory and since the regions marked as MEMORY_HOTPLUG are skipped, they never make it to the linear map. A later access to the memory in those ranges will fail: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000400000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008a3c0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Not tainted 5.13.0 #7 NIP: c00000000008a3c0 LR: c0000000003c1ed8 CTR: 0000000000000040 REGS: c000000008a57770 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.13.0) MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 84222202 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000003c1ed4 DAR: c000000400000000 DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c0000000003c1ed8 c000000008a57a10 c0000000019da700 c000000400000000 GPR04: 0000000000000280 0000000000000180 0000000000000400 0000000000000200 GPR08: 0000000000000100 0000000000000080 0000000000000040 0000000000000300 GPR12: 0000000000000380 c000000001bc0000 c0000000001660c8 c000000006337e00 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000040000000 0000000020000000 c000000001a81990 c000000008c30000 GPR24: c000000008c20000 c000000001a81998 000fffffffff0000 c000000001a819a0 GPR28: c000000001a81908 c00c000001000000 c000000008c40000 c000000008a64680 NIP clear_user_page+0x50/0x80 LR __handle_mm_fault+0xc88/0x1910 Call Trace: __handle_mm_fault+0xc44/0x1910 (unreliable) handle_mm_fault+0x130/0x2a0 __get_user_pages+0x248/0x610 __get_user_pages_remote+0x12c/0x3e0 get_arg_page+0x54/0xf0 copy_string_kernel+0x11c/0x210 kernel_execve+0x16c/0x220 call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x1b0/0x2f0 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 Instruction dump: 79280fa4 79271764 79261f24 794ae8e2 7ca94214 7d683a14 7c893a14 7d893050 7d4903a6 60000000 60000000 60000000 <7c001fec> 7c091fec 7c081fec 7c051fec ---[ end trace 490b8c67e6075e09 ]--- Making for_each_mem_range() include MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG regions in the traversal fixes this issue. Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976100 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210712071132.20902-1-rppt@kernel.org Fixes: b10d6bc ("arch, drivers: replace for_each_membock() with for_each_mem_range()") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 79e482e upstream. Commit b10d6bc ("arch, drivers: replace for_each_membock() with for_each_mem_range()") didn't take into account that when there is movable_node parameter in the kernel command line, for_each_mem_range() would skip ranges marked with MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG. The page table setup code in POWER uses for_each_mem_range() to create the linear mapping of the physical memory and since the regions marked as MEMORY_HOTPLUG are skipped, they never make it to the linear map. A later access to the memory in those ranges will fail: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000400000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008a3c0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Not tainted 5.13.0 #7 NIP: c00000000008a3c0 LR: c0000000003c1ed8 CTR: 0000000000000040 REGS: c000000008a57770 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.13.0) MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 84222202 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000003c1ed4 DAR: c000000400000000 DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c0000000003c1ed8 c000000008a57a10 c0000000019da700 c000000400000000 GPR04: 0000000000000280 0000000000000180 0000000000000400 0000000000000200 GPR08: 0000000000000100 0000000000000080 0000000000000040 0000000000000300 GPR12: 0000000000000380 c000000001bc0000 c0000000001660c8 c000000006337e00 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000040000000 0000000020000000 c000000001a81990 c000000008c30000 GPR24: c000000008c20000 c000000001a81998 000fffffffff0000 c000000001a819a0 GPR28: c000000001a81908 c00c000001000000 c000000008c40000 c000000008a64680 NIP clear_user_page+0x50/0x80 LR __handle_mm_fault+0xc88/0x1910 Call Trace: __handle_mm_fault+0xc44/0x1910 (unreliable) handle_mm_fault+0x130/0x2a0 __get_user_pages+0x248/0x610 __get_user_pages_remote+0x12c/0x3e0 get_arg_page+0x54/0xf0 copy_string_kernel+0x11c/0x210 kernel_execve+0x16c/0x220 call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x1b0/0x2f0 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 Instruction dump: 79280fa4 79271764 79261f24 794ae8e2 7ca94214 7d683a14 7c893a14 7d893050 7d4903a6 60000000 60000000 60000000 <7c001fec> 7c091fec 7c081fec 7c051fec ---[ end trace 490b8c67e6075e09 ]--- Making for_each_mem_range() include MEMBLOCK_HOTPLUG regions in the traversal fixes this issue. Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976100 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210712071132.20902-1-rppt@kernel.org Fixes: b10d6bc ("arch, drivers: replace for_each_membock() with for_each_mem_range()") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…upt() An interrupt handler shall not be called from another interrupt handler otherwise this leads to problems like the following: Kernel attempted to write user page (afd4fa84) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000) ------------[ cut here ]------------ Bug: Write fault blocked by KUAP! WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1617 at arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c:230 do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1617 Comm: sshd Tainted: G W 5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77 #7 NIP: c001b77c LR: c001b77c CTR: 00000000 REGS: cb9e5bc0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 00021032 <ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24942424 XER: 00000000 GPR00: c001b77c cb9e5c80 c1582c00 00000021 3ffffbff 085b0000 00000027 c8eb644c GPR08: 00000023 00000000 00000000 00000000 24942424 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 c07640c4 cb9e5e98 cb9e5e90 GPR24: 00000040 afd4fa96 00000040 02000000 c1fda6c0 afd4fa84 00000300 cb9e5cc0 NIP [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 LR [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 Call Trace: [cb9e5c80] [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 (unreliable) [cb9e5cb0] [c000424c] DataAccess_virt+0xd4/0xe4 --- interrupt: 300 at __copy_tofrom_user+0x110/0x20c NIP: c001f9b4 LR: c03250a0 CTR: 00000004 REGS: cb9e5cc0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 48028468 XER: 20000000 DAR: afd4fa84 DSISR: 0a000000 GPR00: 20726f6f cb9e5d80 c1582c00 00000004 cb9e5e3a 00000016 afd4fa80 00000000 GPR08: 3835202d 72777872 2d78722d 00000004 28028464 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 c07640c4 cb9e5e98 cb9e5e90 GPR24: 00000040 afd4fa96 00000040 cb9e5e0c 00000daa a0000000 cb9e5e98 afd4fa56 NIP [c001f9b4] __copy_tofrom_user+0x110/0x20c LR [c03250a0] _copy_to_iter+0x144/0x990 --- interrupt: 300 [cb9e5d80] [c03e89c0] n_tty_read+0xa4/0x598 (unreliable) [cb9e5df0] [c03e2a0c] tty_read+0xdc/0x2b4 [cb9e5e80] [c0156bf8] vfs_read+0x274/0x340 [cb9e5f00] [c01571ac] ksys_read+0x70/0x118 [cb9e5f30] [c0016048] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x28 --- interrupt: c00 at 0xa7855c88 NIP: a7855c88 LR: a7855c5c CTR: 00000000 REGS: cb9e5f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 0000d032 <EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 2402446c XER: 00000000 GPR00: 00000003 afd4ec70 a72137d0 0000000b afd4ecac 00004000 0065a990 00000800 GPR08: 00000000 a7947930 00000000 00000004 c15831b0 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 0065a9e0 00000001 0065fac0 GPR24: 00000000 00000089 00664050 00000000 00668e30 a720c8dc a7943ff4 0065f9b0 NIP [a7855c88] 0xa7855c88 LR [a7855c5c] 0xa7855c5c --- interrupt: c00 Instruction dump: 3884aa88 38630178 48076861 807f0080 48042e45 2f830000 419e0148 3c80c079 3c60c076 38841be4 386301c0 4801f705 <0fe00000> 3860000b 4bfffe30 3c80c06b ---[ end trace fd69b91a8046c2e5 ]--- Here the problem is that by re-enterring an exception handler, kuap_save_and_lock() is called a second time with this time KUAP access locked, leading to regs->kuap being overwritten hence KUAP not being unlocked at exception exit as expected. Do not call do_IRQ() from timer_interrupt() directly. Instead, redefine do_IRQ() as a standard function named __do_IRQ(), and call it from both do_IRQ() and time_interrupt() handlers. Fixes: 3a96570 ("powerpc: convert interrupt handlers to use wrappers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+ Reported-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c17d234f4927d39a1d7100864a8e1145323d33a0.1628611927.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

…upt() commit 9869416 upstream. An interrupt handler shall not be called from another interrupt handler otherwise this leads to problems like the following: Kernel attempted to write user page (afd4fa84) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000) ------------[ cut here ]------------ Bug: Write fault blocked by KUAP! WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1617 at arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c:230 do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1617 Comm: sshd Tainted: G W 5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77 #7 NIP: c001b77c LR: c001b77c CTR: 00000000 REGS: cb9e5bc0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 00021032 <ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24942424 XER: 00000000 GPR00: c001b77c cb9e5c80 c1582c00 00000021 3ffffbff 085b0000 00000027 c8eb644c GPR08: 00000023 00000000 00000000 00000000 24942424 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 c07640c4 cb9e5e98 cb9e5e90 GPR24: 00000040 afd4fa96 00000040 02000000 c1fda6c0 afd4fa84 00000300 cb9e5cc0 NIP [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 LR [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 Call Trace: [cb9e5c80] [c001b77c] do_page_fault+0x484/0x720 (unreliable) [cb9e5cb0] [c000424c] DataAccess_virt+0xd4/0xe4 --- interrupt: 300 at __copy_tofrom_user+0x110/0x20c NIP: c001f9b4 LR: c03250a0 CTR: 00000004 REGS: cb9e5cc0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 48028468 XER: 20000000 DAR: afd4fa84 DSISR: 0a000000 GPR00: 20726f6f cb9e5d80 c1582c00 00000004 cb9e5e3a 00000016 afd4fa80 00000000 GPR08: 3835202d 72777872 2d78722d 00000004 28028464 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 c07640c4 cb9e5e98 cb9e5e90 GPR24: 00000040 afd4fa96 00000040 cb9e5e0c 00000daa a0000000 cb9e5e98 afd4fa56 NIP [c001f9b4] __copy_tofrom_user+0x110/0x20c LR [c03250a0] _copy_to_iter+0x144/0x990 --- interrupt: 300 [cb9e5d80] [c03e89c0] n_tty_read+0xa4/0x598 (unreliable) [cb9e5df0] [c03e2a0c] tty_read+0xdc/0x2b4 [cb9e5e80] [c0156bf8] vfs_read+0x274/0x340 [cb9e5f00] [c01571ac] ksys_read+0x70/0x118 [cb9e5f30] [c0016048] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x28 --- interrupt: c00 at 0xa7855c88 NIP: a7855c88 LR: a7855c5c CTR: 00000000 REGS: cb9e5f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (5.13.0-pmac-00010-g8393422eb77) MSR: 0000d032 <EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 2402446c XER: 00000000 GPR00: 00000003 afd4ec70 a72137d0 0000000b afd4ecac 00004000 0065a990 00000800 GPR08: 00000000 a7947930 00000000 00000004 c15831b0 0063f8c8 00000000 000186a0 GPR16: afd52dd4 afd52dd0 afd52dcc afd52dc8 0065a990 0065a9e0 00000001 0065fac0 GPR24: 00000000 00000089 00664050 00000000 00668e30 a720c8dc a7943ff4 0065f9b0 NIP [a7855c88] 0xa7855c88 LR [a7855c5c] 0xa7855c5c --- interrupt: c00 Instruction dump: 3884aa88 38630178 48076861 807f0080 48042e45 2f830000 419e0148 3c80c079 3c60c076 38841be4 386301c0 4801f705 <0fe00000> 3860000b 4bfffe30 3c80c06b ---[ end trace fd69b91a8046c2e5 ]--- Here the problem is that by re-enterring an exception handler, kuap_save_and_lock() is called a second time with this time KUAP access locked, leading to regs->kuap being overwritten hence KUAP not being unlocked at exception exit as expected. Do not call do_IRQ() from timer_interrupt() directly. Instead, redefine do_IRQ() as a standard function named __do_IRQ(), and call it from both do_IRQ() and time_interrupt() handlers. Fixes: 3a96570 ("powerpc: convert interrupt handlers to use wrappers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+ Reported-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c17d234f4927d39a1d7100864a8e1145323d33a0.1628611927.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

@offset

[ Upstream commit 36ca794 ] When the max pages (last_page in the swap header + 1) is smaller than the total pages (inode size) of the swapfile, iomap_swapfile_activate overwrites sis->max with total pages. However, frontswap_map is a swap page state bitmap allocated using the initial sis->max page count read from the swap header. If swapfile activation increases sis->max, it's possible for the frontswap code to walk off the end of the bitmap, thereby corrupting kernel memory. [djwong: modify the description a bit; the original paragraph reads: "However, frontswap_map is allocated using max pages. When test and clear the sis offset, which is larger than max pages, of frontswap_map in __frontswap_invalidate_page(), neighbors of frontswap_map may be overwritten, i.e., slab is polluted." Note also that this bug resulted in a behavioral change: activating a swap file that was formatted and later extended results in all pages being activated, not the number of pages recorded in the swap header.] This fixes the issue by considering the limitation of max pages of swap info in iomap_swapfile_add_extent(). To reproduce the case, compile kernel with slub RED ZONE, then run test: $ sudo stress-ng -a 1 -x softlockup,resources -t 72h --metrics --times \ --verify -v -Y /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/stress-statistic-12.yaml \ --log-file /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/stress-logfile-12.txt \ --temp-path /root/tmpdir/stress-ng/ We'll get the error log as below: [ 1151.015141] ============================================================================= [ 1151.016489] BUG kmalloc-16 (Not tainted): Right Redzone overwritten [ 1151.017486] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 1151.017486] [ 1151.018997] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 1151.019873] INFO: 0x0000000084e43932-0x0000000098d17cae @offset=7392. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc [ 1151.021303] INFO: Allocated in __do_sys_swapon+0xcf6/0x1170 age=43417 cpu=9 pid=3816 [ 1151.022538] __slab_alloc+0xe/0x20 [ 1151.023069] __kmalloc_node+0xfd/0x4b0 [ 1151.023704] __do_sys_swapon+0xcf6/0x1170 [ 1151.024346] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 1151.024925] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.025749] INFO: Freed in put_cred_rcu+0xa1/0xc0 age=43424 cpu=3 pid=2041 [ 1151.026889] kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.027405] put_cred_rcu+0xa1/0xc0 [ 1151.027949] rcu_do_batch+0x17d/0x410 [ 1151.028566] rcu_core+0x14e/0x2b0 [ 1151.029084] __do_softirq+0x101/0x29e [ 1151.029645] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 1151.030381] do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x40 [ 1151.031037] do_softirq.part.15+0x2b/0x30 [ 1151.031710] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x4b/0x50 [ 1151.032412] copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x111/0x360 [ 1151.033197] __setup_rt_frame+0xce/0x480 [ 1151.033809] arch_do_signal+0x1a3/0x250 [ 1151.034463] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xcf/0x110 [ 1151.035242] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190 [ 1151.035970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.036795] INFO: Slab 0x000000003b9de4dc objects=44 used=9 fp=0x00000000539e349e flags=0xfffffc0010201 [ 1151.038323] INFO: Object 0x000000004855ba01 @offset=7376 fp=0x0000000000000000 [ 1151.038323] [ 1151.039683] Redzone 000000008d0afd3d: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ................ [ 1151.041180] Object 000000004855ba01: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 1151.042714] Redzone 0000000084e43932: 00 00 00 c0 cc cc cc cc ........ [ 1151.044120] Padding 000000000864c042: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ [ 1151.045615] CPU: 5 PID: 3816 Comm: stress-ng Tainted: G B 5.10.50+ #7 [ 1151.046846] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1151.048633] Call Trace: [ 1151.049072] dump_stack+0x57/0x6a [ 1151.049585] check_bytes_and_report+0xed/0x110 [ 1151.050320] check_object+0x1eb/0x290 [ 1151.050924] ? __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.051646] free_debug_processing+0x151/0x350 [ 1151.052333] __slab_free+0x21a/0x3a0 [ 1151.052938] ? _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 [ 1151.053529] ? __vunmap+0x1de/0x220 [ 1151.054139] ? __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.054796] ? kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.055307] kfree+0x276/0x2b0 [ 1151.055832] __x64_sys_swapoff+0x39a/0x540 [ 1151.056466] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 1151.057084] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1151.057866] RIP: 0033:0x150340b0ffb7 [ 1151.058481] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x150340b0ff8d. [ 1151.059537] RSP: 002b:00007fff7f4ee238 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a8 [ 1151.060768] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff7f4ee66c RCX: 0000150340b0ffb7 [ 1151.061904] RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000018094 RDI: 00007fff7f4ee860 [ 1151.063033] RBP: 00007fff7f4ef980 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000150340a672bd [ 1151.064135] R10: 00007fff7f4edca0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000018094 [ 1151.065253] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 000000000160d930 R15: 00007fff7f4ee66c [ 1151.066413] FIX kmalloc-16: Restoring 0x0000000084e43932-0x0000000098d17cae=0xcc [ 1151.066413] [ 1151.067890] FIX kmalloc-16: Object at 0x000000004855ba01 not freed Fixes: 6748212 ("iomap: add a swapfile activation function") Fixes: a45c0ec ("iomap: move the swapfile code into a separate file") Signed-off-by: Gang Deng <gavin.dg@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

FD uses xyarray__entry that may return NULL if an index is out of bounds. If NULL is returned then a segv happens as FD unconditionally dereferences the pointer. This was happening in a case of with perf iostat as shown below. The fix is to make FD an "int*" rather than an int and handle the NULL case as either invalid input or a closed fd. $ sudo gdb --args perf stat --iostat list ... Breakpoint 1, perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 50 { (gdb) bt #0 perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 #1 0x000055555585c188 in evsel__open_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x555556093410, threads=0x555556086fb0, start_cpu=0, end_cpu=1) at util/evsel.c:1792 #2 0x000055555585cfb2 in evsel__open (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2045 #3 0x000055555585d0db in evsel__open_per_thread (evsel=0x5555560951a0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2065 #4 0x00005555558ece64 in create_perf_stat_counter (evsel=0x5555560951a0, config=0x555555c34700 <stat_config>, target=0x555555c2f1c0 <target>, cpu=0) at util/stat.c:590 #5 0x000055555578e927 in __run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:833 #6 0x000055555578f3c6 in run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:1048 #7 0x0000555555792ee5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at builtin-stat.c:2534 #8 0x0000555555835ed3 in run_builtin (p=0x555555c3f540 <commands+288>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:313 #9 0x0000555555836154 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:365 #10 0x000055555583629f in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe2ec, argv=0x7fffffffe2e0) at perf.c:409 #11 0x0000555555836692 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:539 ... (gdb) c Continuing. Error: The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (uncore_iio_0/event=0x83,umask=0x04,ch_mask=0xF,fc_mask=0x07/). /bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555559b03ea in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpu=1) at evsel.c:166 166 if (FD(evsel, cpu, thread) >= 0) v3. fixes a bug in perf_evsel__run_ioctl where the sense of a branch was backward. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210918054440.2350466-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit 57f0ff0 upstream. It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e6e22e6 upstream. System crash was seen when I/O was run against an NVMe target and aborts were occurring. Crash stack is: -- relevant crash stack -- BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 : #6 [ffffae1f8666bdd0] page_fault at ffffffffa740122e [exception RIP: qla_nvme_abort_work+339] RIP: ffffffffc0f592e3 RSP: ffffae1f8666be80 RFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b581fc8af80 RCX: ffffffffc0f83bd0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9b5839c6c7c8 RDI: 0000000008000000 RBP: ffff9b6832f85000 R8: ffffffffc0f68160 R9: ffffffffc0f70652 R10: ffffae1f862ffdc8 R11: 0000000000000300 R12: 000000000000010d R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9b5839cea000 R15: 0ffff9b583fab170 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffae1f8666be98] process_one_work at ffffffffa6aba184 #8 [ffffae1f8666bed8] worker_thread at ffffffffa6aba39d #9 [ffffae1f8666bf10] kthread at ffffffffa6ac06ed The crash was due to a stale SRB structure access after it was aborted. Fix the issue by removing stale access. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908164622.19240-5-njavali@marvell.com Fixes: 2cabf10 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix hang on NVMe command timeouts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5ec0a6f ] Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL and host crashes due to this. PID: 4481 TASK: ffff89c6941b0000 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "bash" ... #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6 #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417 #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14 #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28] RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c RSP: ffff9a9481713960 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff89c6b1096000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9a9481713990 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: ffff89c64341a2f8 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89c648bab000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89c648bab0c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6 #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re] #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re] Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device Control 2 is reserved for VFs. The PF value applies to all associated VFs. Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports") Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()") Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When IPv6 module gets initialized, but it's hitting an error in inet6_init() where it then needs to undo all the prior initialization work, it also might do a call to ndisc_cleanup() which then calls neigh_table_clear(). In there is a missing timer cancellation of the table's managed_work item. The kernel test robot explicitly triggered this error path and caused a UAF crash similar to the below: [...] [ 28.833183][ C0] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: f7a43288 [ 28.833973][ C0] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 28.834660][ C0] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 28.835319][ C0] *pde = 06b2c067 *pte = 00000000 [ 28.835853][ C0] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT [ 28.836367][ C0] CPU: 0 PID: 303 Comm: sed Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1-00233-g83ff5faa0d3b #7 [ 28.837293][ C0] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 28.838338][ C0] EIP: __run_timers.constprop.0+0x82/0x440 [...] [ 28.845607][ C0] Call Trace: [ 28.845942][ C0] <SOFTIRQ> [ 28.846333][ C0] ? check_preemption_disabled.isra.0+0x2a/0x80 [ 28.846975][ C0] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x8/0xa [ 28.847570][ C0] run_timer_softirq+0xd/0x40 [ 28.848050][ C0] __do_softirq+0xf5/0x576 [ 28.848547][ C0] ? __softirqentry_text_start+0x10/0x10 [ 28.849127][ C0] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2b/0x40 [ 28.849749][ C0] </SOFTIRQ> [ 28.850087][ C0] irq_exit_rcu+0x7d/0xc0 [ 28.850587][ C0] common_interrupt+0x2a/0x40 [ 28.851068][ C0] asm_common_interrupt+0x119/0x120 [...] Note that IPv6 module cannot be unloaded as per 8ce4406 ("ipv6: do not allow ipv6 module to be removed") hence this can only be seen during module initialization error. Tested with kernel test robot's reproducer. Fixes: 7482e38 ("net, neigh: Add NTF_MANAGED flag for managed neighbor entries") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Li Zhijian <zhijianx.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The fixed commit attempts to get the output file descriptor even if the file was never opened e.g. $ perf record uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.002 MB perf.data (7 samples) ] $ perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Segmentation fault (core dumped) $ gdb --quiet perf Reading symbols from perf... (gdb) r inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Starting program: /home/ahunter/bin/perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 35 fileno.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 #1 0x00005621e48dd987 in perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:72 #2 perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:69 #3 cmd_inject (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at builtin-inject.c:1017 #4 0x00005621e4936783 in run_builtin (p=0x5621e4ee6878 <commands+600>, argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:313 #5 0x00005621e4897d5c in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:365 #6 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:409 #7 main (argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:539 (gdb) Fixes: 0ae0389 ("perf tools: Pass a fd to perf_file_header__read_pipe()") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213084829.114772-3-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit c271a55 upstream. The fixed commit attempts to get the output file descriptor even if the file was never opened e.g. $ perf record uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.002 MB perf.data (7 samples) ] $ perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Segmentation fault (core dumped) $ gdb --quiet perf Reading symbols from perf... (gdb) r inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Starting program: /home/ahunter/bin/perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 35 fileno.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 #1 0x00005621e48dd987 in perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:72 #2 perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:69 #3 cmd_inject (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at builtin-inject.c:1017 #4 0x00005621e4936783 in run_builtin (p=0x5621e4ee6878 <commands+600>, argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:313 #5 0x00005621e4897d5c in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:365 #6 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:409 #7 main (argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:539 (gdb) Fixes: 0ae0389 ("perf tools: Pass a fd to perf_file_header__read_pipe()") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213084829.114772-3-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Quota disable ioctl starts a transaction before waiting for the qgroup rescan worker completes. However, this wait can be infinite and results in deadlock because of circular dependency among the quota disable ioctl, the qgroup rescan worker and the other task with transaction such as block group relocation task. The deadlock happens with the steps following: 1) Task A calls ioctl to disable quota. It starts a transaction and waits for qgroup rescan worker completes. 2) Task B such as block group relocation task starts a transaction and joins to the transaction that task A started. Then task B commits to the transaction. In this commit, task B waits for a commit by task A. 3) Task C as the qgroup rescan worker starts its job and starts a transaction. In this transaction start, task C waits for completion of the transaction that task A started and task B committed. This deadlock was found with fstests test case btrfs/115 and a zoned null_blk device. The test case enables and disables quota, and the block group reclaim was triggered during the quota disable by chance. The deadlock was also observed by running quota enable and disable in parallel with 'btrfs balance' command on regular null_blk devices. An example report of the deadlock: [372.469894] INFO: task kworker/u16:6:103 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [372.479944] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.485067] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.493898] task:kworker/u16:6 state:D stack: 0 pid: 103 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.503285] Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [372.510782] Call Trace: [372.514092] <TASK> [372.521684] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.530104] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.538842] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.547092] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.555591] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.561894] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x18bb/0x2610 [btrfs] [372.570506] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [372.578875] ? free_unref_page+0x3f2/0x650 [372.585484] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.591594] ? release_extent_buffer+0x224/0x420 [btrfs] [372.599264] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xc13/0x10c0 [btrfs] [372.607157] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [372.613054] ? btrfs_qgroup_account_extent+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs] [372.620960] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [372.627137] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.633215] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [372.639404] btrfs_work_helper+0x1ae/0xa90 [btrfs] [372.646268] process_one_work+0x7e9/0x1320 [372.652321] ? lock_release+0x6d0/0x6d0 [372.658081] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [372.664513] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.670529] worker_thread+0x59e/0xf90 [372.676172] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320 [372.682440] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [372.687550] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [372.693811] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [372.700052] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [372.705517] </TASK> [372.709747] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:2347 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [372.729827] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.745907] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.767106] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid: 2347 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.787776] Call Trace: [372.801652] <TASK> [372.812961] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.830011] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.852547] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.871761] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.886792] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.901685] wait_current_trans+0x22c/0x310 [btrfs] [372.919743] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x3d0/0x3d0 [btrfs] [372.938923] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.959085] ? join_transaction+0xc75/0xe30 [btrfs] [372.977706] start_transaction+0x938/0x10a0 [btrfs] [372.997168] transaction_kthread+0x19d/0x3c0 [btrfs] [373.013021] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0xfc0/0xfc0 [btrfs] [373.031678] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [373.047420] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.064645] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [373.078571] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [373.091197] </TASK> [373.105611] INFO: task btrfs:3145 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.114147] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.120401] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.130393] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3145 ppid: 3141 flags:0x00004000 [373.140998] Call Trace: [373.145501] <TASK> [373.149654] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.155306] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.161965] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.168469] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [373.175468] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.180814] wait_for_commit+0x104/0x150 [btrfs] [373.187643] ? test_and_set_bit+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.194772] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.201191] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x69/0x3d0 [btrfs] [373.208738] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [373.214704] ? __btrfs_end_transaction+0x347/0x7b0 [btrfs] [373.222342] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x44d/0x2610 [btrfs] [373.230233] ? join_transaction+0x255/0xe30 [btrfs] [373.237334] ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] [373.245251] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [373.253296] relocate_block_group+0x105/0xc20 [btrfs] [373.260533] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1270/0x1270 [373.267516] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x85/0x180 [btrfs] [373.275155] ? merge_reloc_roots+0x710/0x710 [btrfs] [373.283602] ? btrfs_wait_ordered_extents+0xd30/0xd30 [btrfs] [373.291934] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.298180] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x35c/0x930 [btrfs] [373.306047] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x85/0x210 [btrfs] [373.313229] btrfs_balance+0x12f4/0x2d20 [btrfs] [373.320227] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.326206] ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x210/0x210 [btrfs] [373.333591] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.340031] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [373.346910] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x548/0x700 [btrfs] [373.354207] btrfs_ioctl+0x7f2/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.360774] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.367957] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.375327] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.383841] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.389993] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.395828] ? mntput_no_expire+0xf7/0xad0 [373.402083] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.408249] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.414486] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.420938] ? trace_raw_output_lock+0xb4/0xe0 [373.427442] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.434224] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.440660] ? force_qs_rnp+0x2a0/0x6b0 [373.446534] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9b/0x140 [373.452763] ? __blkcg_punt_bio_submit+0x1b0/0x1b0 [373.459732] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.466089] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.472022] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.477513] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.484823] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f4af7e2bb [373.490493] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbf936178 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.500197] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8f4af7e2bb [373.509451] RDX: 00007ffcbf936220 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.518659] RBP: 00007ffcbf93774a R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 00007f8f4b02d4e0 [373.527872] R10: 00007f8f4ae87740 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [373.537222] R13: 00007ffcbf936220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [373.546506] </TASK> [373.550878] INFO: task btrfs:3146 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.559383] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.565748] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.575748] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3146 ppid: 2168 flags:0x00000000 [373.586314] Call Trace: [373.590846] <TASK> [373.595121] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.600901] ? __lock_acquire+0x23db/0x5030 [373.607176] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.613954] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.619157] schedule_timeout+0x168/0x220 [373.625170] ? usleep_range_state+0x150/0x150 [373.631653] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 [373.637767] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [373.643993] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x17b/0x410 [373.651267] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.657677] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.664103] wait_for_completion+0x163/0x250 [373.670437] ? bit_wait_timeout+0x160/0x160 [373.676585] btrfs_quota_disable+0x176/0x9a0 [btrfs] [373.683979] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0x12f0/0x12f0 [btrfs] [373.691340] ? down_write+0xd0/0x130 [373.696880] ? down_write_killable+0x150/0x150 [373.703352] btrfs_ioctl+0x3945/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.710061] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.716192] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.722047] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x23cd/0x3050 [373.728486] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.737032] ? set_pte+0x6a/0x90 [373.742271] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x55/0x1f0 [373.748506] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.754792] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.761083] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.767521] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.774247] ? __up_read+0x182/0x6e0 [373.780026] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x46/0x60 [373.787281] ? up_write+0x460/0x460 [373.792932] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.799232] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.805237] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.810947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.818102] RIP: 0033:0x7f1383ea02bb [373.823847] RSP: 002b:00007fffeb4d71f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.833641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1383ea02bb [373.842961] RDX: 00007fffeb4d7210 RSI: 00000000c0109428 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.852179] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000078 [373.861408] R10: 00007f1383daec78 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fffeb4d874a [373.870647] R13: 0000000000493099 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 [373.879838] </TASK> [373.884018] Showing all locks held in the system: [373.894250] 3 locks held by kworker/4:1/58: [373.900356] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/63: [373.906333] #0: ffffffff8945ff60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 [373.917307] 3 locks held by kworker/u16:6/103: [373.923938] #0: ffff888127b4f138 ((wq_completion)btrfs-qgroup-rescan){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x712/0x1320 [373.936555] #1: ffff88810b817dd8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x73f/0x1320 [373.951109] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x1f6/0x10c0 [btrfs] [373.964027] 2 locks held by less/1803: [373.969982] #0: ffff88813ed56098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x24/0x80 [373.981295] #1: ffffc90000b3b2e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: n_tty_read+0x9e2/0x1060 [373.992969] 1 lock held by btrfs-transacti/2347: [373.999893] #0: ffff88813d4887a8 (&fs_info->transaction_kthread_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: transaction_kthread+0xe3/0x3c0 [btrfs] [374.015872] 3 locks held by btrfs/3145: [374.022298] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl_balance+0xc3/0x700 [btrfs] [374.034456] #1: ffff88813d48a0a0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0xfe5/0x2d20 [btrfs] [374.047646] #2: ffff88813d488838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x354/0x930 [btrfs] [374.063295] 4 locks held by btrfs/3146: [374.069647] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38b1/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.081601] #1: ffff88813d488bb8 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38fd/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.094283] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xc8/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.106885] #3: ffff88813d489800 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xd5/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.126780] ============================================= To avoid the deadlock, wait for the qgroup rescan worker to complete before starting the transaction for the quota disable ioctl. Clear BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag before the wait and the transaction to request the worker to complete. On transaction start failure, set the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag again. These BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag changes can be done safely since the function btrfs_quota_disable is not called concurrently because of fs_info->subvol_sem. Also check the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag in qgroup_rescan_init to avoid another qgroup rescan worker to start after the previous qgroup worker completed. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Suggested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

commit e804861 upstream. Quota disable ioctl starts a transaction before waiting for the qgroup rescan worker completes. However, this wait can be infinite and results in deadlock because of circular dependency among the quota disable ioctl, the qgroup rescan worker and the other task with transaction such as block group relocation task. The deadlock happens with the steps following: 1) Task A calls ioctl to disable quota. It starts a transaction and waits for qgroup rescan worker completes. 2) Task B such as block group relocation task starts a transaction and joins to the transaction that task A started. Then task B commits to the transaction. In this commit, task B waits for a commit by task A. 3) Task C as the qgroup rescan worker starts its job and starts a transaction. In this transaction start, task C waits for completion of the transaction that task A started and task B committed. This deadlock was found with fstests test case btrfs/115 and a zoned null_blk device. The test case enables and disables quota, and the block group reclaim was triggered during the quota disable by chance. The deadlock was also observed by running quota enable and disable in parallel with 'btrfs balance' command on regular null_blk devices. An example report of the deadlock: [372.469894] INFO: task kworker/u16:6:103 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [372.479944] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.485067] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.493898] task:kworker/u16:6 state:D stack: 0 pid: 103 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.503285] Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [372.510782] Call Trace: [372.514092] <TASK> [372.521684] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.530104] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.538842] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.547092] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.555591] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.561894] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x18bb/0x2610 [btrfs] [372.570506] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [372.578875] ? free_unref_page+0x3f2/0x650 [372.585484] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.591594] ? release_extent_buffer+0x224/0x420 [btrfs] [372.599264] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xc13/0x10c0 [btrfs] [372.607157] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [372.613054] ? btrfs_qgroup_account_extent+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs] [372.620960] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [372.627137] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.633215] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [372.639404] btrfs_work_helper+0x1ae/0xa90 [btrfs] [372.646268] process_one_work+0x7e9/0x1320 [372.652321] ? lock_release+0x6d0/0x6d0 [372.658081] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [372.664513] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.670529] worker_thread+0x59e/0xf90 [372.676172] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320 [372.682440] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [372.687550] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [372.693811] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [372.700052] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [372.705517] </TASK> [372.709747] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:2347 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [372.729827] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.745907] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.767106] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid: 2347 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.787776] Call Trace: [372.801652] <TASK> [372.812961] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.830011] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.852547] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.871761] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.886792] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.901685] wait_current_trans+0x22c/0x310 [btrfs] [372.919743] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x3d0/0x3d0 [btrfs] [372.938923] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.959085] ? join_transaction+0xc75/0xe30 [btrfs] [372.977706] start_transaction+0x938/0x10a0 [btrfs] [372.997168] transaction_kthread+0x19d/0x3c0 [btrfs] [373.013021] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0xfc0/0xfc0 [btrfs] [373.031678] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [373.047420] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.064645] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [373.078571] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [373.091197] </TASK> [373.105611] INFO: task btrfs:3145 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.114147] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.120401] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.130393] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3145 ppid: 3141 flags:0x00004000 [373.140998] Call Trace: [373.145501] <TASK> [373.149654] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.155306] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.161965] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.168469] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [373.175468] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.180814] wait_for_commit+0x104/0x150 [btrfs] [373.187643] ? test_and_set_bit+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.194772] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.201191] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x69/0x3d0 [btrfs] [373.208738] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [373.214704] ? __btrfs_end_transaction+0x347/0x7b0 [btrfs] [373.222342] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x44d/0x2610 [btrfs] [373.230233] ? join_transaction+0x255/0xe30 [btrfs] [373.237334] ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] [373.245251] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [373.253296] relocate_block_group+0x105/0xc20 [btrfs] [373.260533] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1270/0x1270 [373.267516] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x85/0x180 [btrfs] [373.275155] ? merge_reloc_roots+0x710/0x710 [btrfs] [373.283602] ? btrfs_wait_ordered_extents+0xd30/0xd30 [btrfs] [373.291934] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.298180] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x35c/0x930 [btrfs] [373.306047] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x85/0x210 [btrfs] [373.313229] btrfs_balance+0x12f4/0x2d20 [btrfs] [373.320227] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.326206] ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x210/0x210 [btrfs] [373.333591] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.340031] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [373.346910] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x548/0x700 [btrfs] [373.354207] btrfs_ioctl+0x7f2/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.360774] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.367957] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.375327] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.383841] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.389993] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.395828] ? mntput_no_expire+0xf7/0xad0 [373.402083] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.408249] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.414486] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.420938] ? trace_raw_output_lock+0xb4/0xe0 [373.427442] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.434224] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.440660] ? force_qs_rnp+0x2a0/0x6b0 [373.446534] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9b/0x140 [373.452763] ? __blkcg_punt_bio_submit+0x1b0/0x1b0 [373.459732] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.466089] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.472022] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.477513] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.484823] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f4af7e2bb [373.490493] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbf936178 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.500197] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8f4af7e2bb [373.509451] RDX: 00007ffcbf936220 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.518659] RBP: 00007ffcbf93774a R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 00007f8f4b02d4e0 [373.527872] R10: 00007f8f4ae87740 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [373.537222] R13: 00007ffcbf936220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [373.546506] </TASK> [373.550878] INFO: task btrfs:3146 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.559383] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.565748] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.575748] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3146 ppid: 2168 flags:0x00000000 [373.586314] Call Trace: [373.590846] <TASK> [373.595121] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.600901] ? __lock_acquire+0x23db/0x5030 [373.607176] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.613954] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.619157] schedule_timeout+0x168/0x220 [373.625170] ? usleep_range_state+0x150/0x150 [373.631653] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 [373.637767] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [373.643993] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x17b/0x410 [373.651267] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.657677] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.664103] wait_for_completion+0x163/0x250 [373.670437] ? bit_wait_timeout+0x160/0x160 [373.676585] btrfs_quota_disable+0x176/0x9a0 [btrfs] [373.683979] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0x12f0/0x12f0 [btrfs] [373.691340] ? down_write+0xd0/0x130 [373.696880] ? down_write_killable+0x150/0x150 [373.703352] btrfs_ioctl+0x3945/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.710061] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.716192] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.722047] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x23cd/0x3050 [373.728486] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.737032] ? set_pte+0x6a/0x90 [373.742271] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x55/0x1f0 [373.748506] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.754792] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.761083] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.767521] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.774247] ? __up_read+0x182/0x6e0 [373.780026] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x46/0x60 [373.787281] ? up_write+0x460/0x460 [373.792932] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.799232] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.805237] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.810947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.818102] RIP: 0033:0x7f1383ea02bb [373.823847] RSP: 002b:00007fffeb4d71f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.833641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1383ea02bb [373.842961] RDX: 00007fffeb4d7210 RSI: 00000000c0109428 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.852179] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000078 [373.861408] R10: 00007f1383daec78 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fffeb4d874a [373.870647] R13: 0000000000493099 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 [373.879838] </TASK> [373.884018] Showing all locks held in the system: [373.894250] 3 locks held by kworker/4:1/58: [373.900356] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/63: [373.906333] #0: ffffffff8945ff60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 [373.917307] 3 locks held by kworker/u16:6/103: [373.923938] #0: ffff888127b4f138 ((wq_completion)btrfs-qgroup-rescan){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x712/0x1320 [373.936555] #1: ffff88810b817dd8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x73f/0x1320 [373.951109] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x1f6/0x10c0 [btrfs] [373.964027] 2 locks held by less/1803: [373.969982] #0: ffff88813ed56098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x24/0x80 [373.981295] #1: ffffc90000b3b2e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: n_tty_read+0x9e2/0x1060 [373.992969] 1 lock held by btrfs-transacti/2347: [373.999893] #0: ffff88813d4887a8 (&fs_info->transaction_kthread_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: transaction_kthread+0xe3/0x3c0 [btrfs] [374.015872] 3 locks held by btrfs/3145: [374.022298] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl_balance+0xc3/0x700 [btrfs] [374.034456] #1: ffff88813d48a0a0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0xfe5/0x2d20 [btrfs] [374.047646] #2: ffff88813d488838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x354/0x930 [btrfs] [374.063295] 4 locks held by btrfs/3146: [374.069647] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38b1/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.081601] #1: ffff88813d488bb8 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38fd/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.094283] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xc8/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.106885] #3: ffff88813d489800 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xd5/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.126780] ============================================= To avoid the deadlock, wait for the qgroup rescan worker to complete before starting the transaction for the quota disable ioctl. Clear BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag before the wait and the transaction to request the worker to complete. On transaction start failure, set the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag again. These BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag changes can be done safely since the function btrfs_quota_disable is not called concurrently because of fs_info->subvol_sem. Also check the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag in qgroup_rescan_init to avoid another qgroup rescan worker to start after the previous qgroup worker completed. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Suggested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When enabling VMD and IOMMU scalable mode, the following kernel panic call trace/kernel log is shown in Eagle Stream platform (Sapphire Rapids CPU) during booting: pci 0000:59:00.5: Adding to iommu group 42 ... vmd 0000:59:00.5: PCI host bridge to bus 10000:80 pci 10000:80:01.0: [8086:352a] type 01 class 0x060400 pci 10000:80:01.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit] pci 10000:80:01.0: enabling Extended Tags pci 10000:80:01.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold pci 10000:80:01.0: DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed pci 10000:80:01.0: Failed to add to iommu group 42: -16 pci 10000:80:03.0: [8086:352b] type 01 class 0x060400 pci 10000:80:03.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit] pci 10000:80:03.0: enabling Extended Tags pci 10000:80:03.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #7 Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR650V3/SB27A86647, BIOS ESE101Y-1.00 01/13/2022 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid.cold+0x26/0x3f Code: 9a 4a ab ff 4c 89 c1 48 c7 c7 40 0c d9 9e e8 b9 b1 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 f0 0c d9 9e e8 a2 b1 fe ff <0f> 0b 48 89 d1 4c 89 c6 4c 89 ca 48 c7 c7 98 0c d9 9e e8 8b b1 fe RSP: 0000:ff5ad434865b3a40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ff4d61160b74b880 RCX: ff4d61255e1fffa8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffeffff RDI: ffffffff9fd34f20 RBP: ff4d611d8e245c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ff5ad434865b3888 R10: ff5ad434865b3880 R11: ff4d61257fdc6fe8 R12: ff4d61160b74b8a0 R13: ff4d61160b74b8a0 R14: ff4d611d8e245c10 R15: ff4d611d8001ba70 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff4d611d5ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ff4d611fa1401000 CR3: 0000000aa0210001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> intel_pasid_alloc_table+0x9c/0x1d0 dmar_insert_one_dev_info+0x423/0x540 ? device_to_iommu+0x12d/0x2f0 intel_iommu_attach_device+0x116/0x290 __iommu_attach_device+0x1a/0x90 iommu_group_add_device+0x190/0x2c0 __iommu_probe_device+0x13e/0x250 iommu_probe_device+0x24/0x150 iommu_bus_notifier+0x69/0x90 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x80 device_add+0x3db/0x7b0 ? arch_memremap_can_ram_remap+0x19/0x50 ? memremap+0x75/0x140 pci_device_add+0x193/0x1d0 pci_scan_single_device+0xb9/0xf0 pci_scan_slot+0x4c/0x110 pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x3a/0x290 vmd_enable_domain.constprop.0+0x63e/0x820 vmd_probe+0x163/0x190 local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80 work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20 process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x1c4/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370 kthread+0xc7/0xf0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x1ca00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The following 'lspci' output shows devices '10000:80:*' are subdevices of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5: $ lspci ... 0000:59:00.5 RAID bus controller: Intel Corporation Volume Management Device NVMe RAID Controller (rev 20) ... 10000:80:01.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352a (rev 03) 10000:80:03.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352b (rev 03) 10000:80:05.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352c (rev 03) 10000:80:07.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352d (rev 03) 10000:81:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Intel Corporation NVMe Datacenter SSD [3DNAND, Beta Rock Controller] 10000:82:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Intel Corporation NVMe Datacenter SSD [3DNAND, Beta Rock Controller] The symptom 'list_add double add' is caused by the following failure message: pci 10000:80:01.0: DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed pci 10000:80:01.0: Failed to add to iommu group 42: -16 pci 10000:80:03.0: [8086:352b] type 01 class 0x060400 Device 10000:80:01.0 is the subdevice of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5, so invoking intel_pasid_alloc_table() gets the pasid_table of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5. Here is call path: intel_pasid_alloc_table pci_for_each_dma_alias get_alias_pasid_table search_pasid_table pci_real_dma_dev() in pci_for_each_dma_alias() gets the real dma device which is the VMD device 0000:59:00.5. However, pte of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5 has been configured during this message "pci 0000:59:00.5: Adding to iommu group 42". So, the status -EBUSY is returned when configuring pasid entry for device 10000:80:01.0. It then invokes dmar_remove_one_dev_info() to release 'struct device_domain_info *' from iommu_devinfo_cache. But, the pasid table is not released because of the following statement in __dmar_remove_one_dev_info(): if (info->dev && !dev_is_real_dma_subdevice(info->dev)) { ... intel_pasid_free_table(info->dev); } The subsequent dmar_insert_one_dev_info() operation of device 10000:80:03.0 allocates 'struct device_domain_info *' from iommu_devinfo_cache. The allocated address is the same address that is released previously for device 10000:80:01.0. Finally, invoking device_attach_pasid_table() causes the issue. `git bisect` points to the offending commit 474dd1c ("iommu/vt-d: Fix clearing real DMA device's scalable-mode context entries"), which releases the pasid table if the device is not the subdevice by checking the returned status of dev_is_real_dma_subdevice(). Reverting the offending commit can work around the issue. The solution is to prevent from allocating pasid table if those devices are subdevices of the VMD device. Fixes: 474dd1c ("iommu/vt-d: Fix clearing real DMA device's scalable-mode context entries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+ Signed-off-by: Adrian Huang <ahuang12@lenovo.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216091307.703-1-adrianhuang0701@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221053348.262724-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>

When "debugfs=off" is used on the kernel command line, iwiwifi's mvm module uses an invalid/unchecked debugfs_dir pointer and causes a BUG: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004f #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 503 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc5 #7 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 15 5510/076F7Y, BIOS 2.4.1 11/05/2021 RIP: 0010:iwl_mvm_dbgfs_register+0x692/0x700 [iwlmvm] Code: 69 a0 be 80 01 00 00 48 c7 c7 50 73 6a a0 e8 95 cf ee e0 48 8b 83 b0 1e 00 00 48 c7 c2 54 73 6a a0 be 64 00 00 00 48 8d 7d 8c <48> 8b 48 50 e8 15 22 07 e1 48 8b 43 28 48 8d 55 8c 48 c7 c7 5f 73 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a0ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffffffffff RBX: ffff88817d6e3328 RCX: ffff88817d6e3328 RDX: ffffffffa06a7354 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffc90000a0ba6c RBP: ffffc90000a0bae0 R08: ffffffff824e4880 R09: ffffffffa069d620 R10: ffffc90000a0ba00 R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90000a0bb28 R14: ffff88817d6e3328 R15: ffff88817d6e3320 FS: 00007f64dd92d740(0000) GS:ffff88847f640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000004f CR3: 000000016fc79001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? iwl_mvm_mac_setup_register+0xbdc/0xda0 [iwlmvm] iwl_mvm_start_post_nvm+0x71/0x100 [iwlmvm] iwl_op_mode_mvm_start+0xab8/0xb30 [iwlmvm] _iwl_op_mode_start+0x6f/0xd0 [iwlwifi] iwl_opmode_register+0x6a/0xe0 [iwlwifi] ? 0xffffffffa0231000 iwl_mvm_init+0x35/0x1000 [iwlmvm] ? 0xffffffffa0231000 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x1b0 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1e5/0x2f0 ? do_init_module+0x1e/0x220 do_init_module+0x48/0x220 load_module+0x2602/0x2bc0 ? __kernel_read+0x145/0x2e0 ? kernel_read_file+0x229/0x290 __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x13/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f64dda564dd Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b 29 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdba393f88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f64dda564dd RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005575399e2ab2 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055753a91c5e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575399e2ab2 R13: 000055753a91ceb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055753a923018 </TASK> Modules linked in: btintel(+) btmtk bluetooth vfat snd_hda_codec_hdmi fat snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic iwlmvm(+) snd_sof_pci_intel_tgl mac80211 snd_sof_intel_hda_common soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence soundwire_bus snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof_pci snd_sof snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_core btrfs snd_compress snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec raid6_pq iwlwifi snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore cfg80211 intel_ish_ipc(+) thunderbolt rfkill intel_ishtp ucsi_acpi wmi i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid evdev CR2: 000000000000004f ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Check the debugfs_dir pointer for an error before using it. Fixes: 8c082a9 ("iwlwifi: mvm: simplify iwl_mvm_dbgfs_register") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220223030630.23241-1-rdunlap@infradead.org [change to make both conditional] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

commit 5a6248c upstream. When "debugfs=off" is used on the kernel command line, iwiwifi's mvm module uses an invalid/unchecked debugfs_dir pointer and causes a BUG: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004f #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 503 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc5 #7 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 15 5510/076F7Y, BIOS 2.4.1 11/05/2021 RIP: 0010:iwl_mvm_dbgfs_register+0x692/0x700 [iwlmvm] Code: 69 a0 be 80 01 00 00 48 c7 c7 50 73 6a a0 e8 95 cf ee e0 48 8b 83 b0 1e 00 00 48 c7 c2 54 73 6a a0 be 64 00 00 00 48 8d 7d 8c <48> 8b 48 50 e8 15 22 07 e1 48 8b 43 28 48 8d 55 8c 48 c7 c7 5f 73 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a0ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffffffffff RBX: ffff88817d6e3328 RCX: ffff88817d6e3328 RDX: ffffffffa06a7354 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffc90000a0ba6c RBP: ffffc90000a0bae0 R08: ffffffff824e4880 R09: ffffffffa069d620 R10: ffffc90000a0ba00 R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90000a0bb28 R14: ffff88817d6e3328 R15: ffff88817d6e3320 FS: 00007f64dd92d740(0000) GS:ffff88847f640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000004f CR3: 000000016fc79001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? iwl_mvm_mac_setup_register+0xbdc/0xda0 [iwlmvm] iwl_mvm_start_post_nvm+0x71/0x100 [iwlmvm] iwl_op_mode_mvm_start+0xab8/0xb30 [iwlmvm] _iwl_op_mode_start+0x6f/0xd0 [iwlwifi] iwl_opmode_register+0x6a/0xe0 [iwlwifi] ? 0xffffffffa0231000 iwl_mvm_init+0x35/0x1000 [iwlmvm] ? 0xffffffffa0231000 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x1b0 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1e5/0x2f0 ? do_init_module+0x1e/0x220 do_init_module+0x48/0x220 load_module+0x2602/0x2bc0 ? __kernel_read+0x145/0x2e0 ? kernel_read_file+0x229/0x290 __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0x130 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x13/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f64dda564dd Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b 29 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdba393f88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f64dda564dd RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005575399e2ab2 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055753a91c5e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575399e2ab2 R13: 000055753a91ceb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055753a923018 </TASK> Modules linked in: btintel(+) btmtk bluetooth vfat snd_hda_codec_hdmi fat snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic iwlmvm(+) snd_sof_pci_intel_tgl mac80211 snd_sof_intel_hda_common soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence soundwire_bus snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof_pci snd_sof snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_soc_core btrfs snd_compress snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec raid6_pq iwlwifi snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore cfg80211 intel_ish_ipc(+) thunderbolt rfkill intel_ishtp ucsi_acpi wmi i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid evdev CR2: 000000000000004f ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Check the debugfs_dir pointer for an error before using it. Fixes: 8c082a9 ("iwlwifi: mvm: simplify iwl_mvm_dbgfs_register") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220223030630.23241-1-rdunlap@infradead.org [change to make both conditional] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b008337 upstream. When enabling VMD and IOMMU scalable mode, the following kernel panic call trace/kernel log is shown in Eagle Stream platform (Sapphire Rapids CPU) during booting: pci 0000:59:00.5: Adding to iommu group 42 ... vmd 0000:59:00.5: PCI host bridge to bus 10000:80 pci 10000:80:01.0: [8086:352a] type 01 class 0x060400 pci 10000:80:01.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit] pci 10000:80:01.0: enabling Extended Tags pci 10000:80:01.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold pci 10000:80:01.0: DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed pci 10000:80:01.0: Failed to add to iommu group 42: -16 pci 10000:80:03.0: [8086:352b] type 01 class 0x060400 pci 10000:80:03.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0001ffff 64bit] pci 10000:80:03.0: enabling Extended Tags pci 10000:80:03.0: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #7 Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR650V3/SB27A86647, BIOS ESE101Y-1.00 01/13/2022 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid.cold+0x26/0x3f Code: 9a 4a ab ff 4c 89 c1 48 c7 c7 40 0c d9 9e e8 b9 b1 fe ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 f0 0c d9 9e e8 a2 b1 fe ff <0f> 0b 48 89 d1 4c 89 c6 4c 89 ca 48 c7 c7 98 0c d9 9e e8 8b b1 fe RSP: 0000:ff5ad434865b3a40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ff4d61160b74b880 RCX: ff4d61255e1fffa8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffeffff RDI: ffffffff9fd34f20 RBP: ff4d611d8e245c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ff5ad434865b3888 R10: ff5ad434865b3880 R11: ff4d61257fdc6fe8 R12: ff4d61160b74b8a0 R13: ff4d61160b74b8a0 R14: ff4d611d8e245c10 R15: ff4d611d8001ba70 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff4d611d5ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ff4d611fa1401000 CR3: 0000000aa0210001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> intel_pasid_alloc_table+0x9c/0x1d0 dmar_insert_one_dev_info+0x423/0x540 ? device_to_iommu+0x12d/0x2f0 intel_iommu_attach_device+0x116/0x290 __iommu_attach_device+0x1a/0x90 iommu_group_add_device+0x190/0x2c0 __iommu_probe_device+0x13e/0x250 iommu_probe_device+0x24/0x150 iommu_bus_notifier+0x69/0x90 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x80 device_add+0x3db/0x7b0 ? arch_memremap_can_ram_remap+0x19/0x50 ? memremap+0x75/0x140 pci_device_add+0x193/0x1d0 pci_scan_single_device+0xb9/0xf0 pci_scan_slot+0x4c/0x110 pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x3a/0x290 vmd_enable_domain.constprop.0+0x63e/0x820 vmd_probe+0x163/0x190 local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80 work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20 process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x1c4/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370 kthread+0xc7/0xf0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x1ca00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The following 'lspci' output shows devices '10000:80:*' are subdevices of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5: $ lspci ... 0000:59:00.5 RAID bus controller: Intel Corporation Volume Management Device NVMe RAID Controller (rev 20) ... 10000:80:01.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352a (rev 03) 10000:80:03.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352b (rev 03) 10000:80:05.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352c (rev 03) 10000:80:07.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation Device 352d (rev 03) 10000:81:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Intel Corporation NVMe Datacenter SSD [3DNAND, Beta Rock Controller] 10000:82:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Intel Corporation NVMe Datacenter SSD [3DNAND, Beta Rock Controller] The symptom 'list_add double add' is caused by the following failure message: pci 10000:80:01.0: DMAR: Setup RID2PASID failed pci 10000:80:01.0: Failed to add to iommu group 42: -16 pci 10000:80:03.0: [8086:352b] type 01 class 0x060400 Device 10000:80:01.0 is the subdevice of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5, so invoking intel_pasid_alloc_table() gets the pasid_table of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5. Here is call path: intel_pasid_alloc_table pci_for_each_dma_alias get_alias_pasid_table search_pasid_table pci_real_dma_dev() in pci_for_each_dma_alias() gets the real dma device which is the VMD device 0000:59:00.5. However, pte of the VMD device 0000:59:00.5 has been configured during this message "pci 0000:59:00.5: Adding to iommu group 42". So, the status -EBUSY is returned when configuring pasid entry for device 10000:80:01.0. It then invokes dmar_remove_one_dev_info() to release 'struct device_domain_info *' from iommu_devinfo_cache. But, the pasid table is not released because of the following statement in __dmar_remove_one_dev_info(): if (info->dev && !dev_is_real_dma_subdevice(info->dev)) { ... intel_pasid_free_table(info->dev); } The subsequent dmar_insert_one_dev_info() operation of device 10000:80:03.0 allocates 'struct device_domain_info *' from iommu_devinfo_cache. The allocated address is the same address that is released previously for device 10000:80:01.0. Finally, invoking device_attach_pasid_table() causes the issue. `git bisect` points to the offending commit 474dd1c ("iommu/vt-d: Fix clearing real DMA device's scalable-mode context entries"), which releases the pasid table if the device is not the subdevice by checking the returned status of dev_is_real_dma_subdevice(). Reverting the offending commit can work around the issue. The solution is to prevent from allocating pasid table if those devices are subdevices of the VMD device. Fixes: 474dd1c ("iommu/vt-d: Fix clearing real DMA device's scalable-mode context entries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+ Signed-off-by: Adrian Huang <ahuang12@lenovo.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216091307.703-1-adrianhuang0701@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221053348.262724-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fe2640b ] In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed. Fixes: 2dd9c11 ("powerpc/pseries: use pci_host_bridge.release_fn() to kfree(phb)") Reported-by: David Dai <zdai@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318034219.1188008-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 67f22ba upstream. Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Since 17fae12, the KPTE gets cleared on a x86 platform once hardware memory corrupts. Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page puts page back buddy only, the kernel has a chance to access the page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE. This leads BUG during accessing on the corrupted KPTE. Suggested by David&Naoya, disable unpoison mechanism when a real HW error happens to avoid BUG like this: Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G M OE 5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ... RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10 Code: ... RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000 RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prep_new_page+0x151/0x170 get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340 __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40 vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280 __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0 handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0 do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680 ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50 exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220615093209.259374-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Fixes: 847ce40 ("HWPOISON: Add unpoisoning support") Fixes: 17fae12 ("x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned") Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4f40a5b upstream. This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting with '-o trunkdiscovery': PID: 1604 TASK: ffff93dac3520000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5] RIP: ffffffffc0c18265 RSP: ffffb79140f73b08 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93dac304a800 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0 RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40 RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50 RBP: ffffb79140f73be8 R8: ffffffffc0691560 R9: 0000000000000006 R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff93dac4040000 R13: ffff93dac2848e00 R14: ffffb79140f73b60 R15: ffffb79140f73b30 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4] #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4] #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4] #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs] #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs] RIP: 00007f6254fce26e RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6254fce26e RDX: 00005600220a82a0 RSI: 00005600220a64d0 RDI: 00005600220a6520 RBP: 00007ffc69496c50 R8: 00005600220a8710 R9: 003035322e323231 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc69496c50 R13: 00005600220a8440 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 0000560020650ef9 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879 CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484 print_report.cold+0x55/0x232 kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0 ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41 ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0 ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360 ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220 ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120 ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180 load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480 ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0 mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460 legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0 path_mount+0x496/0x19d0 __x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00 RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac memcg:ffff888101f7e180 anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201 raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of name string is out of bounds. Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] [chenxiaosong2@huawei.com: cleanup suggested by Hawkins Jiawei] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220709064511.3304299-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707105329.4020708-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Cc: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com> Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

…able Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors, including AMD processors affected by Retbleed. Using IBPB before firmware calls on such systems would cause a GPF at boot like the one below. Do not enable such calls when IBPB support is not present. EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17 general protection fault, maybe for address 0x1: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts RIP: 0010:efi_call_rts Code: e8 37 33 58 ff 41 bf 48 00 00 00 49 89 c0 44 89 f9 48 83 c8 01 4c 89 c2 48 c1 ea 20 66 90 b9 49 00 00 00 b8 01 00 00 00 31 d2 <0f> 30 e8 7b 9f 5d ff e8 f6 f8 ff ff 4c 89 f1 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 48 RSP: 0018:ffffb373800d7e38 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000049 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94fbc19d8fe0 RDI: ffff94fbc1b2b300 RBP: ffffb373800d7e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffffb3738001fd78 R13: ffff94fbc2fcfc00 R14: ffffb3738001fd80 R15: 0000000000000048 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94fc3da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff94fc30201000 CR3: 000000006f610000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __wake_up process_one_work worker_thread ? rescuer_thread kthread ? kthread_complete_and_exit ret_from_fork </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 28a99e9 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls") Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728122602.2500509-1-cascardo@canonical.com

commit 59c026c upstream. When use 'echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger' to trigger kdump, riscv_crash_save_regs() will be called to save regs for vmcore, we found "epc" value 00ffffffa5537400 is not a valid kernel virtual address, but is a user virtual address. Other regs(eg, ra, sp, gp...) are correct kernel virtual address. Actually 0x00ffffffb0dd9400 is the user mode PC of 'PID: 113 Comm: sh', which is saved in the task's stack. [ 21.201701] CPU: 0 PID: 113 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.9 #45 [ 21.201979] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 21.202160] epc : 00ffffffa5537400 ra : ffffffff80088640 sp : ff20000010333b90 [ 21.202435] gp : ffffffff810dde38 tp : ff6000000226c200 t0 : ffffffff8032be7c [ 21.202707] t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 30203a7375746174 s0 : ff20000010333cf0 [ 21.202973] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff20000010333b98 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 21.203243] a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 28c8f0aeffea4e00 [ 21.203519] a5 : 28c8f0aeffea4e00 a6 : 0000000000000009 a7 : ffffffff8035c9b8 [ 21.203794] s2 : ffffffff810df0a8 s3 : ffffffff810df718 s4 : ff20000010333b98 [ 21.204062] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000007 s7 : ffffffff80c4a468 [ 21.204331] s8 : 00ffffffef451410 s9 : 0000000000000007 s10: 00aaaaaac0510700 [ 21.204606] s11: 0000000000000001 t3 : ff60000001218f00 t4 : ff60000001218f00 [ 21.204876] t5 : ff60000001218000 t6 : ff200000103338b8 [ 21.205079] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000008 With the incorrect PC, the backtrace showed by crash tool as below, the first stack frame is abnormal, crash> bt PID: 113 TASK: ff60000002269600 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sh" #0 [ff2000001039bb90] __efistub_.Ldebug_info0 at 00ffffffa5537400 <-- Abnormal #1 [ff2000001039bcf0] panic at ffffffff806578ba #2 [ff2000001039bd50] sysrq_reset_seq_param_set at ffffffff8038c030 #3 [ff2000001039bda0] __handle_sysrq at ffffffff8038c5f8 #4 [ff2000001039be00] write_sysrq_trigger at ffffffff8038cad8 #5 [ff2000001039be20] proc_reg_write at ffffffff801b7edc #6 [ff2000001039be40] vfs_write at ffffffff80152ba6 #7 [ff2000001039be80] ksys_write at ffffffff80152ece #8 [ff2000001039bed0] sys_write at ffffffff80152f46 With the patch, we can get current kernel mode PC, the output as below, [ 17.607658] CPU: 0 PID: 113 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.9 #42 [ 17.607937] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 17.608150] epc : ffffffff800078f8 ra : ffffffff8008862c sp : ff20000010333b90 [ 17.608441] gp : ffffffff810dde38 tp : ff6000000226c200 t0 : ffffffff8032be68 [ 17.608741] t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 666666666666663c s0 : ff20000010333cf0 [ 17.609025] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff20000010333b98 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 17.609320] a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 17.609601] a5 : ff60000001c78000 a6 : 000000000000003c a7 : ffffffff8035c9a4 [ 17.609894] s2 : ffffffff810df0a8 s3 : ffffffff810df718 s4 : ff20000010333b98 [ 17.610186] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000007 s7 : ffffffff80c4a468 [ 17.610469] s8 : 00ffffffca281410 s9 : 0000000000000007 s10: 00aaaaaab5bb6700 [ 17.610755] s11: 0000000000000001 t3 : ff60000001218f00 t4 : ff60000001218f00 [ 17.611041] t5 : ff60000001218000 t6 : ff20000010333988 [ 17.611255] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000008 With the correct PC, the backtrace showed by crash tool as below, crash> bt PID: 113 TASK: ff6000000226c200 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sh" #0 [ff20000010333b90] riscv_crash_save_regs at ffffffff800078f8 <--- Normal #1 [ff20000010333cf0] panic at ffffffff806578c6 #2 [ff20000010333d50] sysrq_reset_seq_param_set at ffffffff8038c03c #3 [ff20000010333da0] __handle_sysrq at ffffffff8038c604 #4 [ff20000010333e00] write_sysrq_trigger at ffffffff8038cae4 #5 [ff20000010333e20] proc_reg_write at ffffffff801b7ee8 #6 [ff20000010333e40] vfs_write at ffffffff80152bb2 #7 [ff20000010333e80] ksys_write at ffffffff80152eda #8 [ff20000010333ed0] sys_write at ffffffff80152f52 Fixes: e53d281 ("RISC-V: Add kdump support") Co-developed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xianting Tian <xianting.tian@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220811074150.3020189-3-xianting.tian@linux.alibaba.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e2dcac2 upstream. The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address. This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer -- say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf() which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program. bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from operations. Therefore, the code is always happy to dereference the bad pointer to trigger a un-handle-able page fault and in turn an oops. However, this is not supposed to happen because at that point the eBPF program is already verified and should not cause a memory error. Sample KASAN trace: [ 25.685056][ T228] ================================================================== [ 25.685680][ T228] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.686210][ T228] Read of size 80 at addr 00000000deadbeef by task poc/228 [ 25.686732][ T228] [ 25.686893][ T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7 #7 [ 25.687375][ T228] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014 [ 25.687991][ T228] Call Trace: [ 25.688223][ T228] <TASK> [ 25.688429][ T228] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e [ 25.688747][ T228] print_report+0xea/0x200 [ 25.689061][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.689401][ T228] ? _printk+0x54/0x6e [ 25.689693][ T228] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0 [ 25.690071][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.690412][ T228] kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 [ 25.690716][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691059][ T228] kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0 [ 25.691405][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691734][ T228] memcpy+0x25/0x60 [ 25.692000][ T228] copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.692328][ T228] bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0 [ 25.692653][ T228] ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0 [ 25.692956][ T228] ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70 [ 25.693324][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580 [ 25.693635][ T228] bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240 [ 25.693937][ T228] bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd [ 25.694394][ T228] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0 [ 25.694756][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0 [ 25.695144][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190 [ 25.695487][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580 [ 25.695776][ T228] __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50 [ 25.696084][ T228] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 [ 25.696393][ T228] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60 [ 25.696815][ T228] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0 [ 25.697202][ T228] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 [ 25.697586][ T228] ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90 [ 25.697899][ T228] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 25.698312][ T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759 [ 25.698624][ T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 a6 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 25.699946][ T228] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3df78468 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [ 25.700526][ T228] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3df78628 RCX: 00007f6d543fb759 [ 25.701071][ T228] RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 00007ffc3df78478 RDI: 000000000000000a [ 25.701636][ T228] RBP: 00007ffc3df78510 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000300000 [ 25.702191][ T228] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 25.702736][ T228] R13: 00007ffc3df78638 R14: 000055a1584aca68 R15: 00007f6d5456a000 [ 25.703282][ T228] </TASK> [ 25.703490][ T228] ================================================================== [ 25.704050][ T228] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Update copy_from_bpfptr() and strncpy_from_bpfptr() so that: - for a kernel pointer, it uses the safe copy_from_kernel_nofault() and strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() functions. - for a userspace pointer, it performs copy_from_user() and strncpy_from_user(). Fixes: af2ac3e ("bpf: Prepare bpf syscall to be used from kernel and user space.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220727132905.45166-1-jinghao@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Jinghao Jia <jinghao@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220729201713.88688-1-jinghao@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…loc() The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc() accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around. This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64). The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur. This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels: aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40 index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]' CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7 Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 dump_stack+0x10/0x16 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Signed-off-by: Tasos Sahanidis <tasos@tasossah.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3707dcab-320a-62ff-63c0-73fc201ef756@tasossah.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

…loc() commit d29f590 upstream. The voice allocator sometimes begins allocating from near the end of the array and then wraps around, however snd_emu10k1_pcm_channel_alloc() accesses the newly allocated voices as if it never wrapped around. This results in out of bounds access if the first voice has a high enough index so that first_voice + requested_voice_count > NUM_G (64). The more voices are requested, the more likely it is for this to occur. This was initially discovered using PipeWire, however it can be reproduced by calling aplay multiple times with 16 channels: aplay -r 48000 -D plughw:CARD=Live,DEV=3 -c 16 /dev/zero UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in sound/pci/emu10k1/emupcm.c:127:40 index 65 is out of range for type 'snd_emu10k1_voice [64]' CPU: 1 PID: 31977 Comm: aplay Tainted: G W IOE 6.0.0-rc2-emu10k1+ #7 Hardware name: ASUSTEK COMPUTER INC P5W DH Deluxe/P5W DH Deluxe, BIOS 3002 07/22/2010 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 dump_stack+0x10/0x16 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 snd_emu10k1_playback_hw_params+0x3bc/0x420 [snd_emu10k1] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x29f/0x600 [snd_pcm] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x188/0x1410 [snd_pcm] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x35/0x170 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x27/0x40 [snd_pcm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Signed-off-by: Tasos Sahanidis <tasos@tasossah.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3707dcab-320a-62ff-63c0-73fc201ef756@tasossah.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 84a5358 ] The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

cti_enable_hw() and cti_disable_hw() are called from an atomic context so shouldn't use runtime PM because it can result in a sleep when communicating with firmware. Since commit 3c66563 ("Revert "firmware: arm_scmi: Add clock management to the SCMI power domain""), this causes a hang on Juno when running the Perf Coresight tests or running this command: perf record -e cs_etm//u -- ls This was also missed until the revert commit because pm_runtime_put() was called with the wrong device until commit 692c9a4 ("coresight: cti: Correct the parameter for pm_runtime_put") With lock and scheduler debugging enabled the following is output: coresight cti_sys0: cti_enable_hw -- dev:cti_sys0 parent: 20020000.cti BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1151 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 330, name: perf-exec preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffff80000822b394>] copy_process+0xa0c/0x1948 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffff80000822b394>] copy_process+0xa0c/0x1948 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 3 PID: 330 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.0.0-00053-g042116d99298 #7 Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Sep 13 2022 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x134/0x140 show_stack+0x20/0x58 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 __might_resched+0x180/0x228 __might_sleep+0x50/0x88 __pm_runtime_resume+0xac/0xb0 cti_enable+0x44/0x120 coresight_control_assoc_ectdev+0xc0/0x150 coresight_enable_path+0xb4/0x288 etm_event_start+0x138/0x170 etm_event_add+0x48/0x70 event_sched_in.isra.122+0xb4/0x280 merge_sched_in+0x1fc/0x3d0 visit_groups_merge.constprop.137+0x16c/0x4b0 ctx_sched_in+0x114/0x1f0 perf_event_sched_in+0x60/0x90 ctx_resched+0x68/0xb0 perf_event_exec+0x138/0x508 begin_new_exec+0x52c/0xd40 load_elf_binary+0x6b8/0x17d0 bprm_execve+0x360/0x7f8 do_execveat_common.isra.47+0x218/0x238 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x60 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0xfc/0x120 do_el0_svc+0x34/0xc0 el0_svc+0x40/0x98 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xc0 el0t_64_sync+0x170/0x174 Fix the issue by removing the runtime PM calls completely. They are not needed here because it must have already been done when building the path for a trace. Fixes: 835d722 ("coresight: cti: Initial CoreSight CTI Driver") Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <Aishwarya.TCV@arm.com> Reported-by: Cristian Marussi <Cristian.Marussi@arm.com> Suggested-by: Suzuki Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Tested-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221005131452.1506328-1-james.clark@arm.com

cti_enable_hw() and cti_disable_hw() are called from an atomic context so shouldn't use runtime PM because it can result in a sleep when communicating with firmware. Since commit 3c66563 ("Revert "firmware: arm_scmi: Add clock management to the SCMI power domain""), this causes a hang on Juno when running the Perf Coresight tests or running this command: perf record -e cs_etm//u -- ls This was also missed until the revert commit because pm_runtime_put() was called with the wrong device until commit 692c9a4 ("coresight: cti: Correct the parameter for pm_runtime_put") With lock and scheduler debugging enabled the following is output: coresight cti_sys0: cti_enable_hw -- dev:cti_sys0 parent: 20020000.cti BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1151 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 330, name: perf-exec preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffff80000822b394>] copy_process+0xa0c/0x1948 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffff80000822b394>] copy_process+0xa0c/0x1948 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 3 PID: 330 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.0.0-00053-g042116d99298 #7 Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Sep 13 2022 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x134/0x140 show_stack+0x20/0x58 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 __might_resched+0x180/0x228 __might_sleep+0x50/0x88 __pm_runtime_resume+0xac/0xb0 cti_enable+0x44/0x120 coresight_control_assoc_ectdev+0xc0/0x150 coresight_enable_path+0xb4/0x288 etm_event_start+0x138/0x170 etm_event_add+0x48/0x70 event_sched_in.isra.122+0xb4/0x280 merge_sched_in+0x1fc/0x3d0 visit_groups_merge.constprop.137+0x16c/0x4b0 ctx_sched_in+0x114/0x1f0 perf_event_sched_in+0x60/0x90 ctx_resched+0x68/0xb0 perf_event_exec+0x138/0x508 begin_new_exec+0x52c/0xd40 load_elf_binary+0x6b8/0x17d0 bprm_execve+0x360/0x7f8 do_execveat_common.isra.47+0x218/0x238 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x60 invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0xfc/0x120 do_el0_svc+0x34/0xc0 el0_svc+0x40/0x98 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xc0 el0t_64_sync+0x170/0x174 Fix the issue by removing the runtime PM calls completely. They are not needed here because it must have already been done when building the path for a trace. Fixes: 835d722 ("coresight: cti: Initial CoreSight CTI Driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <Aishwarya.TCV@arm.com> Reported-by: Cristian Marussi <Cristian.Marussi@arm.com> Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Tested-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> [ Fix build warnings ] Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221025131032.1149459-1-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

KASAN reported a use-after-free with ftrace ops [1]. It was found from vmcore that perf had registered two ops with the same content successively, both dynamic. After unregistering the second ops, a use-after-free occurred. In ftrace_shutdown(), when the second ops is unregistered, the FTRACE_UPDATE_CALLS command is not set because there is another enabled ops with the same content. Also, both ops are dynamic and the ftrace callback function is ftrace_ops_list_func, so the FTRACE_UPDATE_TRACE_FUNC command will not be set. Eventually the value of 'command' will be 0 and ftrace_shutdown() will skip the rcu synchronization. However, ftrace may be activated. When the ops is released, another CPU may be accessing the ops. Add the missing synchronization to fix this problem. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049 Read of size 8 at addr ffff56551965bbc8 by task syz-executor.2/14468 CPU: 1 PID: 14468 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x40c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 show_stack+0x30/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b4/0x248 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x28/0x48c mm/kasan/report.c:387 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:547 [inline] kasan_report+0x118/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:564 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:187 [inline] __asan_load8+0x98/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:253 __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline] ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049 ftrace_graph_call+0x0/0x4 __might_sleep+0x8/0x100 include/linux/perf_event.h:1170 __might_fault mm/memory.c:5183 [inline] __might_fault+0x58/0x70 mm/memory.c:5171 do_strncpy_from_user lib/strncpy_from_user.c:41 [inline] strncpy_from_user+0x1f4/0x4b0 lib/strncpy_from_user.c:139 getname_flags+0xb0/0x31c fs/namei.c:149 getname+0x2c/0x40 fs/namei.c:209 [...] Allocated by task 14445: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:479 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x110/0x13c mm/kasan/common.c:449 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:493 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x440/0x924 mm/slub.c:2950 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:675 [inline] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xb4/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11230 perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline] __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline] __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723 __arm64_sys_perf_event_open+0x6c/0x80 kernel/events/core.c:11723 [...] Freed by task 14445: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x34 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:358 __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x11c/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:437 __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:445 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x2c/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:446 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1569 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1608 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3179 [inline] kfree+0x12c/0xc10 mm/slub.c:4176 perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xa0c/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11434 perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline] __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline] __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723 [...] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20221103031010.166498-1-lihuafei1@huawei.com Fixes: edb096e ("ftrace: Fix memleak when unregistering dynamic ops when tracing disabled") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 60eed1e upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2508708 ] GCC warns about the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), as it looks like the abuse of a pattern to calculate the array size. This pattern appears in the unevaluated part of the ternary operator in _INTC_ARRAY if the parameter is NULL. The replacement uses an alternate approach to return 0 in case of NULL which does not generate the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), but still emits the warning if _INTC_ARRAY is called with a nonarray parameter. This patch is required for successful compilation with -Werror enabled. The idea to use _Generic for type distinction is taken from Comment #7 in https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=108483 by Jakub Jelinek Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/619fa552-c988-35e5-b1d7-fe256c46a272@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 starfive-tech#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 starfive-tech#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] starfive-tech#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] starfive-tech#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] starfive-tech#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 starfive-tech#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 starfive-tech#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 starfive-tech#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 starfive-tech#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 starfive-tech#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc starfive-tech#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d starfive-tech#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 starfive-tech#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

Balance as exclusive state is compatible with paused balance and device add, which makes some things more complicated. The assertion of valid states when starting from paused balance needs to take into account two more states, the combinations can be hit when there are several threads racing to start balance and device add. This won't typically happen when the commands are started from command line. Scenario 1: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE. Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and btrfs_exclop_finish executed finishes before assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE state which lead to assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:456 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_exclop_balance+0x13c/0x310 ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0 ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20 btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320 btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0 ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Scenario 2: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED. Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and btrfs_exclop_balance executed finish before the latter thread execute assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED state which lead to assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE, fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410 ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0 ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20 btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320 btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0 ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd An example of the failed assertion is below, which shows that the paused balance is also needed to be checked. root@syzkaller:/home/xsk# ./repro Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.611428][ T7970] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 0 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.613973][ T7971] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.615456][ T7972] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.617528][ T7973] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.618359][ T7974] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.622589][ T7975] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.624034][ T7976] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.626420][ T7977] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.627643][ T7978] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.629006][ T7979] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 [ 416.630298][ T7980] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.632787][ T7981] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.634282][ T7982] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.636202][ T7983] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 [ 416.637012][ T7984] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 1 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.637759][ T7984] assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458 [ 416.639845][ T7984] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [ 416.640485][ T7984] CPU: 0 PID: 7984 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.2.0 #7 [ 416.641172][ T7984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 416.642090][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e [ 416.644423][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 416.645018][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 416.645763][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7 [ 416.646554][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000 [ 416.647299][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0 [ 416.648041][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 416.648785][ T7984] FS: 00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 416.649616][ T7984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 416.650238][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 416.650980][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 416.651725][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 416.652502][ T7984] PKRU: 55555554 [ 416.652888][ T7984] Call Trace: [ 416.653241][ T7984] <TASK> [ 416.653527][ T7984] btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410 [ 416.654036][ T7984] ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0 [ 416.654465][ T7984] ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20 [ 416.654874][ T7984] btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320 [ 416.655380][ T7984] btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0 [ 416.655822][ T7984] ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80 [ 416.656400][ T7984] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 [ 416.656874][ T7984] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0 [ 416.657346][ T7984] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 416.657922][ T7984] RIP: 0033:0x4546af [ 416.660170][ T7984] RSP: 002b:00007fa2985d4150 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 416.660972][ T7984] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa2985d4640 RCX: 00000000004546af [ 416.661714][ T7984] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000005000940a RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 416.662449][ T7984] RBP: 00007fa2985d41d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffee37a4c4f [ 416.663195][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa2985d4640 [ 416.663951][ T7984] R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 000000000041b320 R15: 00007fa297dd4000 [ 416.664703][ T7984] </TASK> [ 416.665040][ T7984] Modules linked in: [ 416.665590][ T7984] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 416.666176][ T7984] RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x2e [ 416.668775][ T7984] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ea7e28 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 416.669425][ T7984] RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 416.670235][ T7984] RDX: ffff88801d030000 RSI: ffffffff81637e7c RDI: fffff520007d4fb7 [ 416.671050][ T7984] RBP: ffffffff8a533de0 R08: 00000000000000cc R09: 0000000000000000 [ 416.671867][ T7984] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a533da0 [ 416.672685][ T7984] R13: 00000000000001ca R14: 000000005000940a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 416.673501][ T7984] FS: 00007fa2985d4640(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 416.674425][ T7984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 416.675114][ T7984] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018e5e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 416.675933][ T7984] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 416.676760][ T7984] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20230324031611.98986-1-xiaoshoukui@gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: xiaoshoukui <xiaoshoukui@ruijie.com.cn> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

In the function ieee80211_tx_dequeue() there is a particular locking sequence: begin: spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); q_stopped = local->queue_stop_reasons[q]; spin_unlock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); However small the chance (increased by ftracetest), an asynchronous interrupt can occur in between of spin_lock() and spin_unlock(), and the interrupt routine will attempt to lock the same &local->queue_stop_reason_lock again. This will cause a costly reset of the CPU and the wifi device or an altogether hang in the single CPU and single core scenario. The only remaining spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock) that did not disable interrupts was patched, which should prevent any deadlocks on the same CPU/core and the same wifi device. This is the probable trace of the deadlock: kernel: ================================ kernel: WARNING: inconsistent lock state kernel: 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f #4 Tainted: G W kernel: -------------------------------- kernel: inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. kernel: kworker/5:0/25656 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: kernel: ffff9d6190779478 (&local->queue_stop_reason_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_wake_tx_queue+0x2d/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ieee80211_queue_skb+0x450/0x730 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_xmit_fast.constprop.66+0x834/0xa50 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x217/0x530 [mac80211] kernel: ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60/0x580 [mac80211] kernel: dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb5/0x260 kernel: __dev_queue_xmit+0xdbe/0x1200 kernel: neigh_resolve_output+0x166/0x260 kernel: ip_finish_output2+0x216/0xb80 kernel: __ip_finish_output+0x2a4/0x4d0 kernel: ip_finish_output+0x2d/0xd0 kernel: ip_output+0x82/0x2b0 kernel: ip_local_out+0xec/0x110 kernel: igmpv3_sendpack+0x5c/0x90 kernel: igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x26e/0x4e0 kernel: call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x230 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x27f/0x550 kernel: __do_softirq+0xb4/0x3a4 kernel: irq_exit_rcu+0x9b/0xc0 kernel: sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 kernel: asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1f/0x30 kernel: _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3f/0x70 kernel: free_to_partial_list+0x3d6/0x590 kernel: __slab_free+0x1b7/0x310 kernel: kmem_cache_free+0x52d/0x550 kernel: putname+0x5d/0x70 kernel: do_sys_openat2+0x1d7/0x310 kernel: do_sys_open+0x51/0x80 kernel: __x64_sys_openat+0x24/0x30 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc kernel: irq event stamp: 5120729 kernel: hardirqs last enabled at (5120729): [<ffffffff9d149936>] trace_graph_return+0xd6/0x120 kernel: hardirqs last disabled at (5120728): [<ffffffff9d149950>] trace_graph_return+0xf0/0x120 kernel: softirqs last enabled at (5069900): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: softirqs last disabled at (5067555): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: other info that might help us debug this: kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: CPU0 kernel: ---- kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: <Interrupt> kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: 8 locks held by kworker/5:0/25656: kernel: #0: ffff9d618009d138 ((wq_completion)events_freezable){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ca/0x530 kernel: #1: ffffb1ef4637fe68 ((work_completion)(&local->restart_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x530 kernel: #2: ffffffff9f166548 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #3: ffff9d6190778728 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #4: ffff9d619077b480 (&mvm->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #5: ffff9d61907bacd8 (&trans_pcie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: #6: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x59/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: #7: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: stack backtrace: kernel: CPU: 5 PID: 25656 Comm: kworker/5:0 Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f #4 kernel: Hardware name: LENOVO 82H8/LNVNB161216, BIOS GGCN51WW 11/16/2022 kernel: Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211] kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0xa0 kernel: dump_stack+0x14/0x20 kernel: print_usage_bug.part.46+0x208/0x2a0 kernel: mark_lock.part.47+0x605/0x630 kernel: ? sched_clock+0xd/0x20 kernel: ? trace_clock_local+0x14/0x30 kernel: ? __rb_reserve_next+0x5f/0x490 kernel: ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1b/0x50 kernel: __lock_acquire+0x464/0x1990 kernel: ? mark_held_locks+0x4e/0x80 kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_return_to_handler+0x8b/0x100 kernel: ? preempt_count_add+0x4/0x70 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? prepare_ftrace_return+0xc5/0x190 kernel: ? ftrace_graph_func+0x16/0x20 kernel: ? 0xffffffffc02ab0b1 kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x9/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? __rcu_read_lock+0x4/0x40 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x311/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_wake_sw_queue+0x17/0x20 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_unmap+0x1c9/0x1f0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_free+0x55/0x130 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_tx_free+0x63/0x80 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x3f3/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x9/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? mutex_lock_nested+0x4/0x30 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x5f/0x90 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_stop_device+0x78/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: __iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x114/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x76/0x150 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: drv_start+0x79/0x180 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_reconfig+0x1523/0x1ce0 [mac80211] kernel: ? synchronize_net+0x4/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_restart_work+0x108/0x170 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: process_one_work+0x250/0x530 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: worker_thread+0x48/0x3a0 kernel: ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kernel: kthread+0x10f/0x140 kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 kernel: ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 kernel: </TASK> Fixes: 4444bc2 ("wifi: mac80211: Proper mark iTXQs for resumption") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1f58a0d1-d2b9-d851-73c3-93fcc607501c@alu.unizg.hr/ Reported-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Cc: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cdc80531-f25f-6f9d-b15f-25e16130b53a@alu.unizg.hr/ Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: tag, or it goes automatically? Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230425164005.25272-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

commit 675751b upstream. If something was written to the buffer just before destruction, it may be possible (maybe not in a real system, but it did happen in ARCH=um with time-travel) to destroy the ringbuffer before the IRQ work ran, leading this KASAN report (or a crash without KASAN): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a Read of size 8 at addr 000000006d640a48 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W O 6.3.0-rc1 #7 Stack: 60c4f20f 0c203d48 41b58ab3 60f224fc 600477fa 60f35687 60c4f20f 601273dd 00000008 6101eb00 6101eab0 615be548 Call Trace: [<60047a58>] show_stack+0x25e/0x282 [<60c609e0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x96/0xfd [<60c50d4c>] print_report+0x1a7/0x5a8 [<603078d3>] kasan_report+0xc1/0xe9 [<60308950>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1b/0x1d [<60232844>] irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a [<602328b4>] irq_work_tick+0x24/0x34 [<6017f9dc>] update_process_times+0x162/0x196 [<6019f335>] tick_sched_handle+0x1a4/0x1c3 [<6019fd9e>] tick_sched_timer+0x79/0x10c [<601812b9>] __hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x425/0x695 [<60182913>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x16c/0x2c4 [<600486a3>] um_timer+0x164/0x183 [...] Allocated by task 411: save_stack_trace+0x99/0xb5 stack_trace_save+0x81/0x9b kasan_save_stack+0x2d/0x54 kasan_set_track+0x34/0x3e kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x28 ____kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x97 __kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x12 __kmalloc+0xb2/0xe8 load_elf_phdrs+0xee/0x182 [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at 000000006d640800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 584 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [000000006d640800, 000000006d640c00) Add the appropriate irq_work_sync() so the work finishes before the buffers are destroyed. Prior to the commit in the Fixes tag below, there was only a single global IRQ work, so this issue didn't exist. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230427175920.a76159263122.I8295e405c44362a86c995e9c2c37e3e03810aa56@changeid Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 1569345 ("tracing/ring-buffer: Move poll wake ups into ring buffer code") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 starfive-tech#10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 starfive-tech#11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac starfive-tech#12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d starfive-tech#13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 675751b upstream. If something was written to the buffer just before destruction, it may be possible (maybe not in a real system, but it did happen in ARCH=um with time-travel) to destroy the ringbuffer before the IRQ work ran, leading this KASAN report (or a crash without KASAN): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a Read of size 8 at addr 000000006d640a48 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W O 6.3.0-rc1 starfive-tech#7 Stack: 60c4f20f 0c203d48 41b58ab3 60f224fc 600477fa 60f35687 60c4f20f 601273dd 00000008 6101eb00 6101eab0 615be548 Call Trace: [<60047a58>] show_stack+0x25e/0x282 [<60c609e0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x96/0xfd [<60c50d4c>] print_report+0x1a7/0x5a8 [<603078d3>] kasan_report+0xc1/0xe9 [<60308950>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x1b/0x1d [<60232844>] irq_work_run_list+0x11a/0x13a [<602328b4>] irq_work_tick+0x24/0x34 [<6017f9dc>] update_process_times+0x162/0x196 [<6019f335>] tick_sched_handle+0x1a4/0x1c3 [<6019fd9e>] tick_sched_timer+0x79/0x10c [<601812b9>] __hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x425/0x695 [<60182913>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x16c/0x2c4 [<600486a3>] um_timer+0x164/0x183 [...] Allocated by task 411: save_stack_trace+0x99/0xb5 stack_trace_save+0x81/0x9b kasan_save_stack+0x2d/0x54 kasan_set_track+0x34/0x3e kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x28 ____kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x97 __kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x12 __kmalloc+0xb2/0xe8 load_elf_phdrs+0xee/0x182 [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at 000000006d640800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 584 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [000000006d640800, 000000006d640c00) Add the appropriate irq_work_sync() so the work finishes before the buffers are destroyed. Prior to the commit in the Fixes tag below, there was only a single global IRQ work, so this issue didn't exist. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230427175920.a76159263122.I8295e405c44362a86c995e9c2c37e3e03810aa56@changeid Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 1569345 ("tracing/ring-buffer: Move poll wake ups into ring buffer code") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 starfive-tech#5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 starfive-tech#6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac starfive-tech#7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 starfive-tech#8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 starfive-tech#9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 starfive-tech#10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 starfive-tech#11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac starfive-tech#12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d starfive-tech#13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>

A remote DoS vulnerability of RPL Source Routing is assigned CVE-2023-2156. The Source Routing Header (SRH) has the following format: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type | Segments Left | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CmprI | CmprE | Pad | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | . . . Addresses[1..n] . . . | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The originator of an SRH places the first hop's IPv6 address in the IPv6 header's IPv6 Destination Address and the second hop's IPv6 address as the first address in Addresses[1..n]. The CmprI and CmprE fields indicate the number of prefix octets that are shared with the IPv6 Destination Address. When CmprI or CmprE is not 0, Addresses[1..n] are compressed as follows: 1..n-1 : (16 - CmprI) bytes n : (16 - CmprE) bytes Segments Left indicates the number of route segments remaining. When the value is not zero, the SRH is forwarded to the next hop. Its address is extracted from Addresses[n - Segment Left + 1] and swapped with IPv6 Destination Address. When Segment Left is greater than or equal to 2, the size of SRH is not changed because Addresses[1..n-1] are decompressed and recompressed with CmprI. OTOH, when Segment Left changes from 1 to 0, the new SRH could have a different size because Addresses[1..n-1] are decompressed with CmprI and recompressed with CmprE. Let's say CmprI is 15 and CmprE is 0. When we receive SRH with Segment Left >= 2, Addresses[1..n-1] have 1 byte for each, and Addresses[n] has 16 bytes. When Segment Left is 1, Addresses[1..n-1] is decompressed to 16 bytes and not recompressed. Finally, the new SRH will need more room in the header, and the size is (16 - 1) * (n - 1) bytes. Here the max value of n is 255 as Segment Left is u8, so in the worst case, we have to allocate 3825 bytes in the skb headroom. However, now we only allocate a small fixed buffer that is IPV6_RPL_SRH_WORST_SWAP_SIZE (16 + 7 bytes). If the decompressed size overflows the room, skb_push() hits BUG() below [0]. Instead of allocating the fixed buffer for every packet, let's allocate enough headroom only when we receive SRH with Segment Left 1. [0]: skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff81c9f6e2 len:576 put:576 head:ffff8880070b5180 data:ffff8880070b4fb0 tail:0x70 end:0x140 dev:lo kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:200! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 154 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4-00190-gc308e9ec0047 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_panic (net/core/skbuff.c:200) Code: 4f 70 50 8b 87 bc 00 00 00 50 8b 87 b8 00 00 00 50 ff b7 c8 00 00 00 4c 8b 8f c0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 80 6e 77 82 e8 ad 8b 60 ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000003da0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000085 RBX: ffff8880058a6600 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88807dc1c540 RDI: ffff88807dc1c540 RBP: ffffc90000003e48 R08: ffffffff82b392c8 R09: 00000000ffffdfff R10: ffffffff82a592e0 R11: ffffffff82b092e0 R12: ffff888005b1c800 R13: ffff8880070b51b8 R14: ffff888005b1ca18 R15: ffff8880070b5190 FS: 00007f4539f0b740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055670baf3000 CR3: 0000000005b0e000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:210) ipv6_rthdr_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2880 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:634 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:718) ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:437 (discriminator 5)) ip6_input_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:805 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5494) process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:805 net/core/dev.c:5934) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6496) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6565 net/core/dev.c:6696) __do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:207 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:572) do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:472 kernel/softirq.c:459) </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:396) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4272) ip6_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:544 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:134) rawv6_sendmsg (./include/net/dst.h:458 ./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 net/ipv6/raw.c:656 net/ipv6/raw.c:914) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2144) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2156 net/socket.c:2152 net/socket.c:2152) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) RIP: 0033:0x7f453a138aea Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc212a1c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcc212a288 RCX: 00007f453a138aea RDX: 0000000000000060 RSI: 00007f4539084c20 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f4538308e80 R08: 00007ffcc212a300 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f4539712d1b </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 8610c7c ("net: ipv6: add support for rpl sr exthdr") Reported-by: Max VA Closes: https://www.interruptlabs.co.uk/articles/linux-ipv6-route-of-death Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605180617.67284-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ] Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b684c09 ] ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states. Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer. When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because of mismatch between r1 and NIP. GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace. GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch: --------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>, newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0x0000000000000063 in ?? () #3 0xc000000003579320 in ?? () --------- Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because "ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs. GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel: -------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n") at kernel/panic.c:358 #3 0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155 #4 0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602 #5 0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163 #6 0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340 #7 proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352 #8 0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00, buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582 #9 0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2) at fs/read_write.c:637 #10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>) at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171 #11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common () at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192 -------- Nick adds: So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire. Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()") Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b684c09 ] ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states. Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer. When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because of mismatch between r1 and NIP. GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace. GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch: --------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>, newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0x0000000000000063 in ?? () #3 0xc000000003579320 in ?? () --------- Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because "ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs. GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel: -------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n") at kernel/panic.c:358 #3 0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155 #4 0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602 #5 0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163 #6 0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340 #7 proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352 #8 0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00, buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582 #9 0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2) at fs/read_write.c:637 starfive-tech#10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>) at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171 starfive-tech#11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common () at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192 -------- Nick adds: So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire. Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()") Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock: PID: 1063722 TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "handler8" #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91 #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528 #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core] #13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8 #14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower] #15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower] #16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0 [1031218.028143] wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30 [1031218.028589] mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029256] mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029885] process_one_work+0x24e/0x510 Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action. Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding encap tbl lock. Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>

pdp7 merged commit fc3f9b5 into starfive-tech:Fedora May 7, 2021

xypron deleted the CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS branch May 8, 2021 07:09

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config: disable CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS#7

config: disable CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS#7
pdp7 merged 1 commit intostarfive-tech:Fedorafrom
xypron:CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS

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xypron commented May 4, 2021

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