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[uk-ai-resilience] [security] Review repositories:["*"] default scope in gh aw add-wizard PAT onboarding (Tier B, High) #46036

Description

@github-actions

Finding

Tier B — Open With Conditions | SLA: High (remediate within 2 weeks)

PR #45987 merged 2026-07-16 added preconfigured Copilot PAT onboarding in gh aw add-wizard. The feature mints a PAT with repositories: ["*"] scope — granting access to all repositories the token owner can access.

Risk Scoring

Dimension Score (1–5) Rationale
Exposure amplification 4 AI agents using this token can read/write all repos; blast radius is org-wide
Patchability 4 Scope restriction is a config change
Detectability 3 Token scope is visible in GitHub UI but not surfaced in workflow audits
Operational fragility 3 Overly broad token means one compromised agent session = org-wide exposure
Ownership confidence 4 pelikhan is clear owner

Threat Hypothesis

An attacker who gains control of a Copilot agentic session (e.g., via XPIA/prompt injection in cached content — see #45777) and has access to a token minted with repositories: ["*"] can exfiltrate or modify code across all organisation repositories — far beyond the intended single-workflow scope.

Remediation Actions

  1. Audit the current default token scope set by gh aw add-wizard after Add preconfigured Copilot PAT onboarding in gh aw add-wizard #45987.
  2. If the default is repositories: ["*"], change it to repositories: [current-repo] or prompt the user to explicitly opt-in to wildcard scope.
  3. Add a prominent warning in the wizard UI when wildcard scope is selected.
  4. Document least-privilege token guidance in the onboarding flow.

Exception Governance

Related

Run: §29513136890

Generated by UK AI Operational Resilience · 74.6 AIC · ⌖ 5.37 AIC · ⊞ 5.1K ·

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