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45 changes: 45 additions & 0 deletions queries/binary-planting.ql
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
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/**
* @name Exec call vulnerable to binary planting
* @description On Windows, executing a binary with an unqualified name will execute a binary in the working directory in preference to a binary on PATH.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @id javascript/codeql-action/binary-planting
*/

import javascript
import DataFlow
import DataFlow::PathGraph

class SafeWhichBarrierGuardNode extends DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode, DataFlow::InvokeNode {
SafeWhichBarrierGuardNode() { getCalleeName() = "safeWhich" }

override predicate blocks(boolean outcome, Expr e) {
outcome = true and
e = getArgument(0).asExpr()
}
}

class BinaryPlantingConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
BinaryPlantingConfiguration() {
this = "BinaryPlantingConfiguration"
}

override predicate isSource(Node node) {
node.asExpr() instanceof StringLiteral and
not node.asExpr().(StringLiteral).getValue().matches("%/%") and
not node.getFile().getBaseName().matches("%.test.ts")
}

override predicate isSink(Node node) {
node instanceof SystemCommandExecution or
exists(InvokeExpr e | e.getCalleeName() = "ToolRunner" and e.getArgument(0) = node.asExpr())
}

override predicate isBarrierGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode guard) {
guard instanceof SafeWhichBarrierGuardNode
}
}

from BinaryPlantingConfiguration cfg, PathNode source, PathNode sink
where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select source.getNode(), source, sink, "This exec call might be vulnerable to Windows binary planting vulnerabilities."