riscv: dts: starfive: jh7100: Refer to labels from aliases by geertu · Pull Request #3 · esmil/linux

geertu · 2021-05-11T13:57:20Z

Let the aliases refer to device nodes using their labels, instead of
absolute paths.

Fixes: 3ca5133 ("riscv: dts: Add JH7100 and BeagleV Starlight support")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven geert@linux-m68k.org

Note: include Update GPIO driver[v0.9->v1.0] improves the module init and exit function to make sure that the driver can be initialized earlier than other drivers which need to use GPIO. Signed-off-by: Huan Feng <huan.feng@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

Clear CNTR of PWM after setting period & duty_cycle

…ive VIC7100

[FIXME] why we can not do it in U-boot?

Note: including uSDK v0.9->v1.0 patch

drivers/usb/cdns3/ drivers/usb/core/ drivers/usb/host/ include/linux/usb.h

1, add ov5640&sc2235 drivers, update stf_isp 2, add MIPI/CSI/DSI drivers for VIC7100

… drivers

Fix sf_fb_map_video_memory in starfive_fb.c

Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

This IP is also used on the Starfive JH7100 riscv64 SoC and presumable also the upcoming JH7110 SoC. Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

Descriptor management was simplified with commit: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ef6fb2d6f1abd56cc067c694253ea362159b5ac3 Code added to dw-axi-dmac-platform driver due to VIC7100 Cache Coherency issues needed follow those changes. Signed-off-by: Michael Scott <mike@foundries.io>

The BeagleV Starlight v0.9 board doesn't have the IRQB line from the pmic routed to the SoC, so this hack is needed to allow the driver to be loaded without it. See beagleboard/beaglev-starlight#14 Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

This is the device tree from https://github.com/starfive-tech/u-boot/ Rearranged, cleanups, fixes and TPS65086 added by Emil. Cleanups, fixes and LED added by Geert. Signed-off-by: yanhong.wang <yanhong.wang@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: Huan.Feng <huan.feng@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: ke.zhu <ke.zhu@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: yiming.li <yiming.li@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: jack.zhu <jack.zhu@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: Samin Guo <samin.guo@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: Chenjieqin <Jessica.Chen@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: bo.li <bo.li@starfivetech.com> Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>

Let the aliases refer to device nodes using their labels, instead of absolute paths. Fixes: 3ca5133 ("riscv: dts: Add JH7100 and BeagleV Starlight support") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>

esmil · 2021-05-11T14:49:10Z

Thanks. This is definitely an improvement, but according to the datasheet we have the chip has both spi0, spi1, spi2, spi3 and the qspi, so calling qspi "spi0" in the chip dtsi file is probably not the right thing to do. Come to think of it all these aliases should probably be moved to the board file instead. Right?

commit 57f0ff0 upstream. It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 340fa66 ] Recent changes exposed a bug where specifically-timed requests to the path manager netlink API could trigger a divide-by-zero in __tcp_select_window(), as syzkaller does: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 9667 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x509/0xa60 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3016 Code: 44 89 ff e8 c9 29 e9 fd 45 39 e7 0f 8d 20 ff ff ff e8 db 28 e9 fd 44 89 e3 e9 13 ff ff ff e8 ce 28 e9 fd 44 89 e0 44 89 e3 99 <f7> 7c 24 04 29 d3 e9 fc fe ff ff e8 b7 28 e9 fd 44 89 f1 48 89 ea RSP: 0018:ffff888031ccf020 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811532c080 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff835807c2 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: ffffed1020b92441 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 1ffff11006399e08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa4c8344700(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2f424000 CR3: 000000003e4e2003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: tcp_select_window net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:264 [inline] __tcp_transmit_skb+0xc00/0x37a0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1351 __tcp_send_ack.part.0+0x3ec/0x760 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3972 __tcp_send_ack net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3978 [inline] tcp_send_ack+0x7d/0xa0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3978 mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x1ab/0x380 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:654 mptcp_pm_remove_addr+0x161/0x200 net/mptcp/pm.c:58 mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address+0x197/0x460 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1328 mptcp_nl_cmd_del_addr+0x98b/0xd40 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1359 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x225/0x340 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5b0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 netlink_rcv_skb+0x148/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x846/0xd80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x14e/0x190 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x709/0x870 net/socket.c:2403 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2457 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2486 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack() was attempting to send a TCP ACK on the first subflow in the MPTCP socket's connection list without validating that the subflow was in a suitable connection state. To address this, always validate subflow state when sending extra ACKs on subflows for address advertisement or subflow priority change. Fixes: 84dfe36 ("mptcp: send out dedicated ADD_ADDR packet") Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#229 Co-developed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 98e2e40 upstream. When the refcount is decreased to 0, the resource reclamation branch is entered. Before CPU0 reaches the race point (1), CPU1 may obtain the spinlock and traverse the rbtree to find 'root', see nilfs_lookup_root(). Although CPU1 will call refcount_inc() to increase the refcount, it is obviously too late. CPU0 will release 'root' directly, CPU1 then accesses 'root' and triggers UAF. Use refcount_dec_and_lock() to ensure that both the operations of decrease refcount to 0 and link deletion are lock protected eliminates this risk. CPU0 CPU1 nilfs_put_root(): <-------- (1) spin_lock(&nilfs->ns_cptree_lock); rb_erase(&root->rb_node, &nilfs->ns_cptree); spin_unlock(&nilfs->ns_cptree_lock); kfree(root); <-------- use-after-free refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9476 at lib/refcount.c:28 \ refcount_warn_saturate+0x1cf/0x210 lib/refcount.c:28 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 9476 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.45-rc1+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x1cf/0x210 lib/refcount.c:28 ... ... Call Trace: __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:283 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] nilfs_put_root+0xc1/0xd0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:795 nilfs_segctor_destroy fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2749 [inline] nilfs_detach_log_writer+0x3fa/0x570 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2812 nilfs_put_super+0x2f/0xf0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:467 generic_shutdown_super+0xcd/0x1f0 fs/super.c:464 kill_block_super+0x4a/0x90 fs/super.c:1446 deactivate_locked_super+0x6a/0xb0 fs/super.c:335 deactivate_super+0x85/0x90 fs/super.c:366 cleanup_mnt+0x277/0x2e0 fs/namespace.c:1118 __cleanup_mnt+0x15/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1125 task_work_run+0x8e/0x110 kernel/task_work.c:151 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:164 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13c/0x170 kernel/entry/common.c:191 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:266 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:56 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 There is no reproduction program, and the above is only theoretical analysis. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1629859428-5906-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Fixes: ba65ae4 ("nilfs2: add checkpoint tree to nilfs object") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210723012317.4146-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8f96a5b ] We update the ctime/mtime of a block device when we remove it so that blkid knows the device changed. However we do this by re-opening the block device and calling filp_update_time. This is more correct because it'll call the inode->i_op->update_time if it exists, but the block dev inodes do not do this. Instead call generic_update_time() on the bd_inode in order to avoid the blkdev_open path and get rid of the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2+ #406 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/11596 is trying to acquire lock: ffff939640d2f538 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff939655510c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x25/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 do_sys_openat2+0x7b/0x130 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x56/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 file_open_name+0xc7/0x170 filp_open+0x2c/0x50 btrfs_scratch_superblocks.part.0+0x10f/0x170 btrfs_rm_device.cold+0xe8/0xed btrfs_ioctl+0x2a31/0x2e70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0xc2/0x240 [loop] loop_process_work+0x238/0xd00 [loop] process_one_work+0x26b/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x245/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/11596: #0: ffff939655510c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 11596 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #406 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? stack_trace_save+0x3b/0x50 __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? verify_cpu+0xf0/0x100 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] ? blkdev_ioctl+0x8d/0x2a0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 3fa421d ] When removing the device we call blkdev_put() on the device once we've removed it, and because we have an EXCL open we need to take the ->open_mutex on the block device to clean it up. Unfortunately during device remove we are holding the sb writers lock, which results in the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2+ #407 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/11595 is trying to acquire lock: ffff973ac35dd138 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x25/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 do_sys_openat2+0x7b/0x130 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 blkdev_put+0x3a/0x220 btrfs_rm_device.cold+0x62/0xe5 btrfs_ioctl+0x2a31/0x2e70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0xc2/0x240 [loop] loop_process_work+0x238/0xd00 [loop] process_one_work+0x26b/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x245/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/11595: #0: ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11595 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #407 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? stack_trace_save+0x3b/0x50 __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? verify_cpu+0xf0/0x100 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] ? blkdev_ioctl+0x8d/0x2a0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc21255d4cb So instead save the bdev and do the put once we've dropped the sb writers lock in order to avoid the lockdep recursion. Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit dfbb340 ] If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net (v2) The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: 1) Move back the defrag users fields to the global netns_nf area. Kernel fails to boot if conntrack is builtin and kernel is booted with: nf_conntrack.enable_hooks=1. From Florian Westphal. 2) Rule event notification is missing relevant context such as the position handle and the NLM_F_APPEND flag. 3) Rule replacement is expanded to add + delete using the existing rule handle, reverse order of this operation so it makes sense from rule notification standpoint. 4) Propagate to userspace the NLM_F_CREATE and NLM_F_EXCL flags from the rule notification path. Patches #2, #3 and #4 are used by 'nft monitor' and 'iptables-monitor' userspace utilities which are not correctly representing the following operations through netlink notifications: - rule insertions - rule addition/insertion from position handle - create table/chain/set/map/flowtable/... ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When passing 'phys' in the devicetree to describe the USB PHY phandle (which is the recommended way according to Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/ci-hdrc-usb2.txt) the following NULL pointer dereference is observed on i.MX7 and i.MX8MM: [ 1.489344] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098 [ 1.498170] Mem abort info: [ 1.500966] ESR = 0x96000044 [ 1.504030] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1.509356] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1.512416] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1.515569] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1.520458] Data abort info: [ 1.523349] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044 [ 1.527196] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 1.530176] [0000000000000098] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 1.536544] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1.542125] Modules linked in: [ 1.545190] CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.14.0-dirty #3 [ 1.551901] Hardware name: Kontron i.MX8MM N801X S (DT) [ 1.557133] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.562984] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 1.568998] pc : imx7d_charger_detection+0x3f0/0x510 [ 1.573973] lr : imx7d_charger_detection+0x22c/0x510 This happens because the charger functions check for the phy presence inside the imx_usbmisc_data structure (data->usb_phy), but the chipidea core populates the usb_phy passed via 'phys' inside 'struct ci_hdrc' (ci->usb_phy) instead. This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside imx7d_charger_detection(). Fix it by also searching for 'phys' in case 'fsl,usbphy' is not found. Tested on a imx7s-warp board. Fixes: 746f316 ("usb: chipidea: introduce imx7d USB charger detection") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery@gmail.com> Tested-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de> Reviewed-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de> Acked-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921113754.767631-1-festevam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…rbage value Currently, when the rule related to IDLETIMER is added, idletimer_tg timer structure is initialized by kmalloc on executing idletimer_tg_create function. However, in this process timer->timer_type is not defined to a specific value. Thus, timer->timer_type has garbage value and it occurs kernel panic. So, this commit fixes the panic by initializing timer->timer_type using kzalloc instead of kmalloc. Test commands: # iptables -A OUTPUT -j IDLETIMER --timeout 1 --label test $ cat /sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/test Killed Splat looks like: BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in alarm_expires_remaining+0x49/0x70 Read of size 8 at addr 0000002e8c7bc4c8 by task cat/917 CPU: 12 PID: 917 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.14.0+ #3 79940a339f71eb14fc81aee1757a20d5bf13eb0e Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x9c kasan_report.cold+0x112/0x117 ? alarm_expires_remaining+0x49/0x70 __asan_load8+0x86/0xb0 alarm_expires_remaining+0x49/0x70 idletimer_tg_show+0xe5/0x19b [xt_IDLETIMER 11219304af9316a21bee5ba9d58f76a6b9bccc6d] dev_attr_show+0x3c/0x60 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x11d/0x1f0 ? device_remove_bin_file+0x20/0x20 kernfs_seq_show+0xa4/0xb0 seq_read_iter+0x29c/0x750 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x25a/0x2c0 ? __fsnotify_parent+0x3d1/0x570 ? iov_iter_init+0x70/0x90 new_sync_read+0x2a7/0x3d0 ? __x64_sys_llseek+0x230/0x230 ? rw_verify_area+0x81/0x150 vfs_read+0x17b/0x240 ksys_read+0xd9/0x180 ? vfs_write+0x460/0x460 ? do_syscall_64+0x16/0xc0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x120 __x64_sys_read+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0cdc819142 Code: c0 e9 c2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 3a ca 0a 00 e8 f5 19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff28eee5b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f0cdc819142 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f0cdc032000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f0cdc032000 R08: 00007f0cdc031010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005607e9ee31f0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Fixes: 68983a3 ("netfilter: xtables: Add snapshot of hardidletimer target") Signed-off-by: Juhee Kang <claudiajkang@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

If the device used as a serial console gets detached/attached at runtime, register_console() will try to call imx_uart_setup_console(), but this is not possible since it is marked as __init. For instance # cat /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/active tty1 ttymxc0 # echo -n N > /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/subsystem/ttymxc0/console # echo -n Y > /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/subsystem/ttymxc0/console [ 73.166649] 8<--- cut here --- [ 73.167005] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c154d928 [ 73.167601] pgd = 55433e84 [ 73.167875] [c154d928] *pgd=8141941e(bad) [ 73.168304] Internal error: Oops: 8000000d [#1] SMP ARM [ 73.168429] Modules linked in: [ 73.168522] CPU: 0 PID: 536 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.15.0-rc6-00056-g3968ddcf05fb #3 [ 73.168675] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Ultralite (Device Tree) [ 73.168791] PC is at imx_uart_console_setup+0x0/0x238 [ 73.168927] LR is at try_enable_new_console+0x98/0x124 [ 73.169056] pc : [<c154d928>] lr : [<c0196f44>] psr: a0000013 [ 73.169178] sp : c2ef5e70 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000 [ 73.169281] r10: 00000000 r9 : c02cf970 r8 : 00000000 [ 73.169389] r7 : 00000001 r6 : 00000001 r5 : c1760164 r4 : c1e0fb08 [ 73.169512] r3 : c154d928 r2 : 00000000 r1 : efffcbd r0 : c1760164 [ 73.169641] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 73.169782] Control: 10c5387d Table: 8345406a DAC: 00000051 [ 73.169895] Register r0 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170032] Register r1 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170158] Register r2 information: NULL pointer [ 73.170273] Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170397] Register r4 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170521] Register r5 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170647] Register r6 information: non-paged memory [ 73.170771] Register r7 information: non-paged memory [ 73.170892] Register r8 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171009] Register r9 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.171142] Register r10 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171259] Register r11 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171375] Register r12 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171494] Process sh (pid: 536, stack limit = 0xcd1ba82f) [ 73.171621] Stack: (0xc2ef5e70 to 0xc2ef6000) [ 73.171731] 5e60: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.171899] 5e80: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172059] 5ea0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172217] 5ec0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172377] 5ee0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172537] 5f00: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172698] 5f20: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172856] 5f40: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173016] 5f60: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173177] 5f80: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173336] 5fa0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173496] 5fc0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173654] 5fe0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173826] [<c0196f44>] (try_enable_new_console) from [<c01984a8>] (register_console+0x10c/0x2ec) [ 73.174053] [<c01984a8>] (register_console) from [<c06e2c90>] (console_store+0x14c/0x168) [ 73.174262] [<c06e2c90>] (console_store) from [<c0383718>] (kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x110/0x1cc) [ 73.174470] [<c0383718>] (kernfs_fop_write_iter) from [<c02cf5f4>] (vfs_write+0x31c/0x548) [ 73.174679] [<c02cf5f4>] (vfs_write) from [<c02cf970>] (ksys_write+0x60/0xec) [ 73.174863] [<c02cf970>] (ksys_write) from [<c0100080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) [ 73.175052] Exception stack(0xc2ef5fa8 to 0xc2ef5ff0) [ 73.175167] 5fa0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175327] 5fc0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175486] 5fe0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175608] Code: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 (00000000) [ 73.175744] ---[ end trace 9b75121265109bf1 ]--- A similar issue could be triggered by unbinding/binding the serial console device [*]. Drop __init so that imx_uart_setup_console() can be safely called at runtime. [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20181114174940.7865-3-stefan@agner.ch/ Fixes: a3cb39d ("serial: core: Allow detach and attach serial device for console") Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211020192643.476895-2-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

On the preemption path when updating a Xen guest's runstate times, this lock is taken inside the scheduler rq->lock, which is a raw spinlock. This was shown in a lockdep warning: [ 89.138354] ============================= [ 89.138356] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 89.138358] 5.15.0-rc5+ #834 Tainted: G S I E [ 89.138360] ----------------------------- [ 89.138361] xen_shinfo_test/2575 is trying to lock: [ 89.138363] ffffa34a0364efd8 (&kvm->arch.pvclock_gtod_sync_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: get_kvmclock_ns+0x1f/0x130 [kvm] [ 89.138442] other info that might help us debug this: [ 89.138444] context-{5:5} [ 89.138445] 4 locks held by xen_shinfo_test/2575: [ 89.138447] #0: ffff972bdc3b8108 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x77/0x6f0 [kvm] [ 89.138483] #1: ffffa34a03662e90 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdc/0x8b0 [kvm] [ 89.138526] #2: ffff97331fdbac98 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0xff/0xbd0 [ 89.138534] #3: ffffa34a03662e90 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_arch_vcpu_put+0x26/0x170 [kvm] ... [ 89.138695] get_kvmclock_ns+0x1f/0x130 [kvm] [ 89.138734] kvm_xen_update_runstate+0x14/0x90 [kvm] [ 89.138783] kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest+0x15/0xd0 [kvm] [ 89.138830] kvm_arch_vcpu_put+0xe6/0x170 [kvm] [ 89.138870] kvm_sched_out+0x2f/0x40 [kvm] [ 89.138900] __schedule+0x5de/0xbd0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+b282b65c2c68492df769@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 30b5c85 ("KVM: x86/xen: Add support for vCPU runstate information") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Message-Id: <1b02a06421c17993df337493a68ba923f3bd5c0f.camel@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

As a full union is always sent, ensure all bytes of the union are initialized with memset to avoid msan warnings of use of uninitialized memory. An example warning from the daemon test: Uninitialized bytes in __interceptor_write at offset 71 inside [0x7ffd98da6280, 72) ==11602==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5597edccdbe4 in ion tools/lib/perf/lib.c:18:6 #1 0x5597edccdbe4 in writen tools/lib/perf/lib.c:47:9 #2 0x5597ed221d30 in send_cmd tools/perf/builtin-daemon.c:1376:22 #3 0x5597ed21b48c in cmd_daemon tools/perf/builtin-daemon.c #4 0x5597ed1d6b67 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11 #5 0x5597ed1d6036 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8 #6 0x5597ed1d6036 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2 #7 0x5597ed1d6036 in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3 SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value tools/lib/perf/lib.c:18:6 in ion Exiting Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210617055554.1917997-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Convert the 9p filesystem to use the netfs helper lib to handle readpage, readahead and write_begin, converting those into a common issue_op for the filesystem itself to handle. The netfs helper lib also handles reading from fscache if a cache is available, and interleaving reads from both sources. This change also switches from the old fscache I/O API to the new one, meaning that fscache no longer keeps track of netfs pages and instead does async DIO between the backing files and the 9p file pagecache. As a part of this change, the handling of PG_fscache changes. It now just means that the cache has a write I/O operation in progress on a page (PG_locked is used for a read I/O op). Note that this is a cut-down version of the fscache rewrite and does not change any of the cookie and cache coherency handling. Changes ======= ver #4: - Rebase on top of folios. - Don't use wait_on_page_bit_killable(). ver #3: - v9fs_req_issue_op() needs to terminate the subrequest. - v9fs_write_end() needs to call SetPageUptodate() a bit more often. - It's not CONFIG_{AFS,V9FS}_FSCACHE[1] - v9fs_init_rreq() should take a ref on the p9_fid and the cleanup should drop it [from Dominique Martinet]. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YUm+xucHxED+1MJp@codewreck.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163162772646.438332.16323773205855053535.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163189109885.2509237.7153668924503399173.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163363943896.1980952.1226527304649419689.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163551662876.1877519.14706391695553204156.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163584179557.4023316.11089762304657644342.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk # rebase on folio Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>

Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL and host crashes due to this. PID: 4481 TASK: ffff89c6941b0000 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "bash" ... #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6 #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417 #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14 #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28] RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c RSP: ffff9a9481713960 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff89c6b1096000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9a9481713990 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: ffff89c64341a2f8 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89c648bab000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89c648bab0c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6 #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re] #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re] Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device Control 2 is reserved for VFs. The PF value applies to all associated VFs. Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports") Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()") Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>

Patch series "Solve silent data loss caused by poisoned page cache (shmem/tmpfs)", v5. When discussing the patch that splits page cache THP in order to offline the poisoned page, Noaya mentioned there is a bigger problem [1] that prevents this from working since the page cache page will be truncated if uncorrectable errors happen. By looking this deeper it turns out this approach (truncating poisoned page) may incur silent data loss for all non-readonly filesystems if the page is dirty. It may be worse for in-memory filesystem, e.g. shmem/tmpfs since the data blocks are actually gone. To solve this problem we could keep the poisoned dirty page in page cache then notify the users on any later access, e.g. page fault, read/write, etc. The clean page could be truncated as is since they can be reread from disk later on. The consequence is the filesystems may find poisoned page and manipulate it as healthy page since all the filesystems actually don't check if the page is poisoned or not in all the relevant paths except page fault. In general, we need make the filesystems be aware of poisoned page before we could keep the poisoned page in page cache in order to solve the data loss problem. To make filesystems be aware of poisoned page we should consider: - The page should be not written back: clearing dirty flag could prevent from writeback. - The page should not be dropped (it shows as a clean page) by drop caches or other callers: the refcount pin from hwpoison could prevent from invalidating (called by cache drop, inode cache shrinking, etc), but it doesn't avoid invalidation in DIO path. - The page should be able to get truncated/hole punched/unlinked: it works as it is. - Notify users when the page is accessed, e.g. read/write, page fault and other paths (compression, encryption, etc). The scope of the last one is huge since almost all filesystems need do it once a page is returned from page cache lookup. There are a couple of options to do it: 1. Check hwpoison flag for every path, the most straightforward way. 2. Return NULL for poisoned page from page cache lookup, the most callsites check if NULL is returned, this should have least work I think. But the error handling in filesystems just return -ENOMEM, the error code will incur confusion to the users obviously. 3. To improve #2, we could return error pointer, e.g. ERR_PTR(-EIO), but this will involve significant amount of code change as well since all the paths need check if the pointer is ERR or not just like option #1. I did prototypes for both #1 and #3, but it seems #3 may require more changes than #1. For #3 ERR_PTR will be returned so all the callers need to check the return value otherwise invalid pointer may be dereferenced, but not all callers really care about the content of the page, for example, partial truncate which just sets the truncated range in one page to 0. So for such paths it needs additional modification if ERR_PTR is returned. And if the callers have their own way to handle the problematic pages we need to add a new FGP flag to tell FGP functions to return the pointer to the page. It may happen very rarely, but once it happens the consequence (data corruption) could be very bad and it is very hard to debug. It seems this problem had been slightly discussed before, but seems no action was taken at that time. [2] As the aforementioned investigation, it needs huge amount of work to solve the potential data loss for all filesystems. But it is much easier for in-memory filesystems and such filesystems actually suffer more than others since even the data blocks are gone due to truncating. So this patchset starts from shmem/tmpfs by taking option #1. TODO: * The unpoison has been broken since commit 0ed950d ("mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page()"), and this patch series make refcount check for unpoisoning shmem page fail. * Expand to other filesystems. But I haven't heard feedback from filesystem developers yet. Patch breakdown: Patch #1: cleanup, depended by patch #2 Patch #2: fix THP with hwpoisoned subpage(s) PMD map bug Patch #3: coding style cleanup Patch #4: refactor and preparation. Patch #5: keep the poisoned page in page cache and handle such case for all the paths. Patch #6: the previous patches unblock page cache THP split, so this patch add page cache THP split support. This patch (of 4): A minor cleanup to the indent. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-1-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-4-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

After removing /dev/kmem, sanitizing /proc/kcore and handling /dev/mem, this series tackles the last sane way how a VM could accidentially access logically unplugged memory managed by a virtio-mem device: /proc/vmcore When dumping memory via "makedumpfile", PG_offline pages, used by virtio-mem to flag logically unplugged memory, are already properly excluded; however, especially when accessing/copying /proc/vmcore "the usual way", we can still end up reading logically unplugged memory part of a virtio-mem device. Patch #1-#3 are cleanups. Patch #4 extends the existing oldmem_pfn_is_ram mechanism. Patch #5-#7 are virtio-mem refactorings for patch #8, which implements the virtio-mem logic to query the state of device blocks. Patch #8: "Although virtio-mem currently supports reading unplugged memory in the hypervisor, this will change in the future, indicated to the device via a new feature flag. We similarly sanitized /proc/kcore access recently. [...] Distributions that support virtio-mem+kdump have to make sure that the virtio_mem module will be part of the kdump kernel or the kdump initrd; dracut was recently [2] extended to include virtio-mem in the generated initrd. As long as no special kdump kernels are used, this will automatically make sure that virtio-mem will be around in the kdump initrd and sanitize /proc/vmcore access -- with dracut" This is the last remaining bit to support VIRTIO_MEM_F_UNPLUGGED_INACCESSIBLE [3] in the Linux implementation of virtio-mem. Note: this is best-effort. We'll never be able to control what runs inside the second kernel, really, but we also don't have to care: we only care about sane setups where we don't want our VM getting zapped once we touch the wrong memory location while dumping. While we usually expect sane setups to use "makedumfile", nothing really speaks against just copying /proc/vmcore, especially in environments where HWpoisioning isn't typically expected. Also, we really don't want to put all our trust completely on the memmap, so sanitizing also makes sense when just using "makedumpfile". [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-1-david@redhat.com [2] dracutdevs/dracut#1157 [3] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202109/msg00021.html This patch (of 9): The callback is only used for the vmcore nowadays. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrvsky@oracle.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

It is generally unsafe to call put_device() with dpm_list_mtx held, because the given device's release routine may carry out an action depending on that lock which then may deadlock, so modify the system-wide suspend and resume of devices to always drop dpm_list_mtx before calling put_device() (and adjust white space somewhat while at it). For instance, this prevents the following splat from showing up in the kernel log after a system resume in certain configurations: [ 3290.969514] ====================================================== [ 3290.969517] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3290.969519] 5.15.0+ #2420 Tainted: G S [ 3290.969523] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3290.969525] systemd-sleep/4553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3290.969529] ffff888117ab1138 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.969554] but task is already holding lock: [ 3290.969556] ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.969571] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3290.969573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3290.969575] -> #3 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969583] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969591] device_pm_add+0x2e/0xe0 [ 3290.969597] device_add+0x4d5/0x8f0 [ 3290.969605] hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x43/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969689] hci_conn_complete_evt.isra.71+0x124/0x750 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969747] hci_event_packet+0xd6c/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969798] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969842] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969851] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969859] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969865] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.969872] -> #2 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969881] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969887] hci_event_packet+0xba/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969935] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969978] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969985] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969993] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969999] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970004] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970013] process_one_work+0x27d/0x650 [ 3290.970020] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.970028] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.970033] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970038] -> #0 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970047] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970054] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970059] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970066] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970073] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970081] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970130] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970195] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970201] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970211] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970215] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970220] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970229] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970236] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970243] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970251] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970257] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970263] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970269] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970276] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970284] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3290.970285] Chain exists of: (wq_completion)hci0#2 --> &hdev->lock --> dpm_list_mtx [ 3290.970297] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3290.970299] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3290.970300] ---- ---- [ 3290.970302] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970306] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 3290.970310] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970314] lock((wq_completion)hci0#2); [ 3290.970319] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3290.970321] 7 locks held by systemd-sleep/4553: [ 3290.970325] #0: ffff888103bcd448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970341] #1: ffff888115a14488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x103/0x1b0 [ 3290.970355] #2: ffff888100f719e0 (kn->active#233){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 3290.970369] #3: ffffffff82661048 (autosleep_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: state_store+0x12/0x90 [ 3290.970384] #4: ffffffff82658ac8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9f/0x310 [ 3290.970399] #5: ffffffff827f2a48 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x4c/0x80 [ 3290.970416] #6: ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.970428] stack backtrace: [ 3290.970431] CPU: 3 PID: 4553 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G S 5.15.0+ #2420 [ 3290.970438] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9380/0RYJWW, BIOS 1.5.0 06/03/2019 [ 3290.970441] Call Trace: [ 3290.970446] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57 [ 3290.970454] check_noncircular+0x105/0x120 [ 3290.970468] ? __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970474] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970487] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970493] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970503] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x60 [ 3290.970510] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x240 [ 3290.970519] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970526] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970544] ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970552] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970561] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970572] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970624] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970687] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970695] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970705] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970710] ? dpm_resume_early+0x251/0x3b0 [ 3290.970718] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970723] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970737] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970746] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970755] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970764] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970777] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970785] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970794] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970803] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970811] RIP: 0033:0x7f41b1328164 [ 3290.970819] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 4a d2 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83 [ 3290.970824] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6ae21b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 3290.970831] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f41b1328164 [ 3290.970836] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055965e651070 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970839] RBP: 000055965e651070 R08: 000055965e64f390 R09: 00007f41b1e3d1c0 [ 3290.970843] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970846] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055965e64f2b0 R15: 0000000000000004 Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 8ef9dc0 ] We got the following lockdep splat while running fstests (specifically btrfs/003 and btrfs/020 in a row) with the new rc. This was uncovered by 87579e9 ("loop: use worker per cgroup instead of kworker") which converted loop to using workqueues, which comes with lockdep annotations that don't exist with kworkers. The lockdep splat is as follows: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/156417 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9c7645b02d38 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 but task is already holding lock: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x163/0x3a0 path_openat+0x74d/0xa40 do_filp_open+0x9c/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0xb1/0x170 __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xd1/0x3c0 blkdev_get_by_path+0xc0/0xd0 btrfs_scan_one_device+0x52/0x1f0 [btrfs] btrfs_control_ioctl+0xac/0x170 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 btrfs_rm_device+0x48/0x6a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2d1c/0x3110 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#11){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0x112/0x290 [loop] loop_process_work+0x25f/0xcb0 [loop] process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x266/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/156417: #0: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 8 PID: 156417 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0x10a/0x120 __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] ? __lock_acquire+0x3a0/0x1dc0 ? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x152/0x360 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120 ? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f645884de6b Usually the uuid_mutex exists to protect the fs_devices that map together all of the devices that match a specific uuid. In rm_device we're messing with the uuid of a device, so it makes sense to protect that here. However in doing that it pulls in a whole host of lockdep dependencies, as we call mnt_may_write() on the sb before we grab the uuid_mutex, thus we end up with the dependency chain under the uuid_mutex being added under the normal sb write dependency chain, which causes problems with loop devices. We don't need the uuid mutex here however. If we call btrfs_scan_one_device() before we scratch the super block we will find the fs_devices and not find the device itself and return EBUSY because the fs_devices is open. If we call it after the scratch happens it will not appear to be a valid btrfs file system. We do not need to worry about other fs_devices modifying operations here because we're protected by the exclusive operations locking. So drop the uuid_mutex here in order to fix the lockdep splat. A more detailed explanation from the discussion: We are worried about rm and scan racing with each other, before this change we'll zero the device out under the UUID mutex so when scan does run it'll make sure that it can go through the whole device scan thing without rm messing with us. We aren't worried if the scratch happens first, because the result is we don't think this is a btrfs device and we bail out. The only case we are concerned with is we scratch _after_ scan is able to read the superblock and gets a seemingly valid super block, so lets consider this case. Scan will call device_list_add() with the device we're removing. We'll call find_fsid_with_metadata_uuid() and get our fs_devices for this UUID. At this point we lock the fs_devices->device_list_mutex. This is what protects us in this case, but we have two cases here. 1. We aren't to the device removal part of the RM. We found our device, and device name matches our path, we go down and we set total_devices to our super number of devices, which doesn't affect anything because we haven't done the remove yet. 2. We are past the device removal part, which is protected by the device_list_mutex. Scan doesn't find the device, it goes down and does the if (fs_devices->opened) return -EBUSY; check and we bail out. Nothing about this situation is ideal, but the lockdep splat is real, and the fix is safe, tho admittedly a bit scary looking. Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ copy more from the discussion ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit bc39a69 ] Limit when FPU is enabled to only functions that does FPU operations for dcn20_resource_construct, which gets called during driver initialization. Enabling FPU operation disables preemption. Sleeping functions(mutex (un)lock, memory allocation using GFP_KERNEL, etc.) should not be called when preemption is disabled. Fixes the following case caught by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP in kernel config [ 1.338434] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:281 [ 1.347395] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 197, name: systemd-udevd [ 1.356356] CPU: 7 PID: 197 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.13.0+ #3 [ 1.356358] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME X570-PRO, BIOS 3405 02/01/2021 [ 1.356360] Call Trace: [ 1.356361] dump_stack+0x6b/0x86 [ 1.356366] ___might_sleep.cold+0x87/0x98 [ 1.356370] __might_sleep+0x4b/0x80 [ 1.356372] mutex_lock+0x21/0x50 [ 1.356376] smu_get_uclk_dpm_states+0x3f/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 1.356538] pp_nv_get_uclk_dpm_states+0x35/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 1.356711] init_soc_bounding_box+0xf9/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 1.356892] ? create_object+0x20d/0x340 [ 1.356897] ? dcn20_resource_construct+0x46f/0xd30 [amdgpu] [ 1.357077] dcn20_resource_construct+0x4b1/0xd30 [amdgpu] ... Tested on: 5700XT (NAVI10 0x1002:0x731F 0x1DA2:0xE410 0xC1) Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Hersen Wu <hersenxs.wu@amd.com> Cc: Anson Jacob <Anson.Jacob@amd.com> Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Acked-by: Agustin Gutierrez <agustin.gutierrez@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Anson Jacob <Anson.Jacob@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…eam state [ Upstream commit b7b1d02 ] The internal stream state sets the timeout to 120 seconds 2 seconds after the creation of the flow, attach this internal stream state to the IPS_ASSURED flag for consistent event reporting. Before this patch: [NEW] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED] [DESTROY] udp 17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED] Note IPS_ASSURED for the flow not yet in the internal stream state. after this update: [NEW] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [UPDATE] udp 17 120 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED] [DESTROY] udp 17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED] Before this patch, short-lived UDP flows never entered IPS_ASSURED, so they were already candidate flow to be deleted by early_drop under stress. Before this patch, IPS_ASSURED is set on regardless the internal stream state, attach this internal stream state to IPS_ASSURED. packet #1 (original direction) enters NEW state packet #2 (reply direction) enters ESTABLISHED state, sets on IPS_SEEN_REPLY paclet #3 (any direction) sets on IPS_ASSURED (if 2 seconds since the creation has passed by). Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6d0d1b5 ] If the device used as a serial console gets detached/attached at runtime, register_console() will try to call imx_uart_setup_console(), but this is not possible since it is marked as __init. For instance # cat /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/active tty1 ttymxc0 # echo -n N > /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/subsystem/ttymxc0/console # echo -n Y > /sys/devices/virtual/tty/console/subsystem/ttymxc0/console [ 73.166649] 8<--- cut here --- [ 73.167005] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c154d928 [ 73.167601] pgd = 55433e84 [ 73.167875] [c154d928] *pgd=8141941e(bad) [ 73.168304] Internal error: Oops: 8000000d [#1] SMP ARM [ 73.168429] Modules linked in: [ 73.168522] CPU: 0 PID: 536 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.15.0-rc6-00056-g3968ddcf05fb #3 [ 73.168675] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Ultralite (Device Tree) [ 73.168791] PC is at imx_uart_console_setup+0x0/0x238 [ 73.168927] LR is at try_enable_new_console+0x98/0x124 [ 73.169056] pc : [<c154d928>] lr : [<c0196f44>] psr: a0000013 [ 73.169178] sp : c2ef5e70 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000 [ 73.169281] r10: 00000000 r9 : c02cf970 r8 : 00000000 [ 73.169389] r7 : 00000001 r6 : 00000001 r5 : c1760164 r4 : c1e0fb08 [ 73.169512] r3 : c154d928 r2 : 00000000 r1 : efffcbd r0 : c1760164 [ 73.169641] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 73.169782] Control: 10c5387d Table: 8345406a DAC: 00000051 [ 73.169895] Register r0 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170032] Register r1 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170158] Register r2 information: NULL pointer [ 73.170273] Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170397] Register r4 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170521] Register r5 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.170647] Register r6 information: non-paged memory [ 73.170771] Register r7 information: non-paged memory [ 73.170892] Register r8 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171009] Register r9 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory [ 73.171142] Register r10 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171259] Register r11 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171375] Register r12 information: NULL pointer [ 73.171494] Process sh (pid: 536, stack limit = 0xcd1ba82f) [ 73.171621] Stack: (0xc2ef5e70 to 0xc2ef6000) [ 73.171731] 5e60: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.171899] 5e80: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172059] 5ea0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172217] 5ec0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172377] 5ee0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172537] 5f00: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172698] 5f20: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.172856] 5f40: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173016] 5f60: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173177] 5f80: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173336] 5fa0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173496] 5fc0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173654] 5fe0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.173826] [<c0196f44>] (try_enable_new_console) from [<c01984a8>] (register_console+0x10c/0x2ec) [ 73.174053] [<c01984a8>] (register_console) from [<c06e2c90>] (console_store+0x14c/0x168) [ 73.174262] [<c06e2c90>] (console_store) from [<c0383718>] (kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x110/0x1cc) [ 73.174470] [<c0383718>] (kernfs_fop_write_iter) from [<c02cf5f4>] (vfs_write+0x31c/0x548) [ 73.174679] [<c02cf5f4>] (vfs_write) from [<c02cf970>] (ksys_write+0x60/0xec) [ 73.174863] [<c02cf970>] (ksys_write) from [<c0100080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) [ 73.175052] Exception stack(0xc2ef5fa8 to 0xc2ef5ff0) [ 73.175167] 5fa0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175327] 5fc0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175486] 5fe0: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? [ 73.175608] Code: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 (00000000) [ 73.175744] ---[ end trace 9b75121265109bf1 ]--- A similar issue could be triggered by unbinding/binding the serial console device [*]. Drop __init so that imx_uart_setup_console() can be safely called at runtime. [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20181114174940.7865-3-stefan@agner.ch/ Fixes: a3cb39d ("serial: core: Allow detach and attach serial device for console") Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211020192643.476895-2-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5ec0a6f ] Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL and host crashes due to this. PID: 4481 TASK: ffff89c6941b0000 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "bash" ... #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6 #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417 #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14 #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28] RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c RSP: ffff9a9481713960 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff89c6b1096000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9a9481713990 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: ffff89c64341a2f8 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89c648bab000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89c648bab0c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6 #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re] #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re] Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device Control 2 is reserved for VFs. The PF value applies to all associated VFs. Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports") Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()") Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 2aa3660 upstream. It is generally unsafe to call put_device() with dpm_list_mtx held, because the given device's release routine may carry out an action depending on that lock which then may deadlock, so modify the system-wide suspend and resume of devices to always drop dpm_list_mtx before calling put_device() (and adjust white space somewhat while at it). For instance, this prevents the following splat from showing up in the kernel log after a system resume in certain configurations: [ 3290.969514] ====================================================== [ 3290.969517] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3290.969519] 5.15.0+ #2420 Tainted: G S [ 3290.969523] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3290.969525] systemd-sleep/4553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3290.969529] ffff888117ab1138 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.969554] but task is already holding lock: [ 3290.969556] ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.969571] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3290.969573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3290.969575] -> #3 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969583] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969591] device_pm_add+0x2e/0xe0 [ 3290.969597] device_add+0x4d5/0x8f0 [ 3290.969605] hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x43/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969689] hci_conn_complete_evt.isra.71+0x124/0x750 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969747] hci_event_packet+0xd6c/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969798] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969842] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969851] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969859] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969865] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.969872] -> #2 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969881] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969887] hci_event_packet+0xba/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969935] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969978] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969985] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969993] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969999] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970004] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970013] process_one_work+0x27d/0x650 [ 3290.970020] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.970028] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.970033] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970038] -> #0 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970047] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970054] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970059] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970066] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970073] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970081] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970130] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970195] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970201] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970211] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970215] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970220] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970229] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970236] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970243] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970251] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970257] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970263] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970269] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970276] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970284] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3290.970285] Chain exists of: (wq_completion)hci0#2 --> &hdev->lock --> dpm_list_mtx [ 3290.970297] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3290.970299] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3290.970300] ---- ---- [ 3290.970302] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970306] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 3290.970310] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970314] lock((wq_completion)hci0#2); [ 3290.970319] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3290.970321] 7 locks held by systemd-sleep/4553: [ 3290.970325] #0: ffff888103bcd448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970341] #1: ffff888115a14488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x103/0x1b0 [ 3290.970355] #2: ffff888100f719e0 (kn->active#233){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 3290.970369] #3: ffffffff82661048 (autosleep_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: state_store+0x12/0x90 [ 3290.970384] #4: ffffffff82658ac8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9f/0x310 [ 3290.970399] #5: ffffffff827f2a48 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x4c/0x80 [ 3290.970416] #6: ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.970428] stack backtrace: [ 3290.970431] CPU: 3 PID: 4553 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G S 5.15.0+ #2420 [ 3290.970438] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9380/0RYJWW, BIOS 1.5.0 06/03/2019 [ 3290.970441] Call Trace: [ 3290.970446] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57 [ 3290.970454] check_noncircular+0x105/0x120 [ 3290.970468] ? __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970474] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970487] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970493] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970503] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x60 [ 3290.970510] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x240 [ 3290.970519] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970526] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970544] ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970552] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970561] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970572] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970624] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970687] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970695] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970705] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970710] ? dpm_resume_early+0x251/0x3b0 [ 3290.970718] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970723] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970737] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970746] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970755] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970764] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970777] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970785] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970794] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970803] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970811] RIP: 0033:0x7f41b1328164 [ 3290.970819] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 4a d2 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83 [ 3290.970824] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6ae21b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 3290.970831] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f41b1328164 [ 3290.970836] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055965e651070 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970839] RBP: 000055965e651070 R08: 000055965e64f390 R09: 00007f41b1e3d1c0 [ 3290.970843] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970846] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055965e64f2b0 R15: 0000000000000004 Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Often some test cases like btrfs/161 trigger lockdep splats that complain about possible unsafe lock scenario due to the fact that during mount, when reading the chunk tree we end up calling blkdev_get_by_path() while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree. That produces a lockdep splat like the following: [ 3653.683975] ====================================================== [ 3653.685148] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3653.686301] 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 Not tainted [ 3653.687239] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3653.688400] mount/447465 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3653.689320] ffff8c6b0c76e528 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.691054] but task is already holding lock: [ 3653.692155] ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.693978] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3653.695510] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3653.696915] -> #3 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3653.698053] down_read_nested+0x4b/0x140 [ 3653.698893] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.699988] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 [btrfs] [ 3653.701205] btrfs_search_slot+0x537/0xc00 [btrfs] [ 3653.702234] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x32/0x70 [btrfs] [ 3653.703332] btrfs_init_new_device+0x563/0x15b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.704439] btrfs_ioctl+0x2110/0x3530 [btrfs] [ 3653.705405] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.706215] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.706990] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.708040] -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3653.708994] lock_release+0x13d/0x4a0 [ 3653.709533] up_write+0x18/0x160 [ 3653.710017] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x5b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.710699] __loop_update_dio+0xbd/0x170 [loop] [ 3653.711360] lo_ioctl+0x3b1/0x8a0 [loop] [ 3653.711929] block_ioctl+0x48/0x50 [ 3653.712442] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.712991] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.713519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.714233] -> #1 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.715026] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.715648] lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] [ 3653.716275] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0x90 [ 3653.716867] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x142/0x320 [ 3653.717537] blkdev_open+0x5e/0xa0 [ 3653.718043] do_dentry_open+0x163/0x390 [ 3653.718604] path_openat+0x3f0/0xa80 [ 3653.719128] do_filp_open+0xa9/0x150 [ 3653.719652] do_sys_openat2+0x97/0x160 [ 3653.720197] __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 [ 3653.720766] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.721285] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.721986] -> #0 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.722775] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.723348] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.723867] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.724394] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.725041] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.725614] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726332] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726999] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.727739] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.728384] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.729130] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.729676] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.730192] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.730800] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.731427] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.731970] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.732486] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.732997] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.733560] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.734080] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.734782] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3653.735784] Chain exists of: &disk->open_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-chunk-00 [ 3653.737123] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3653.737865] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3653.738435] ---- ---- [ 3653.739007] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.739449] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 3653.740193] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.740955] lock(&disk->open_mutex); [ 3653.741431] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3653.742176] 3 locks held by mount/447465: [ 3653.742739] #0: ffff8c6acf85c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xd5/0x3b0 [ 3653.744114] #1: ffffffffc0b28f70 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x59/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.745563] #2: ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.747066] stack backtrace: [ 3653.747723] CPU: 4 PID: 447465 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 [ 3653.748873] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3653.750592] Call Trace: [ 3653.750967] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 [ 3653.751526] check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 [ 3653.752136] ? stack_trace_save+0x4b/0x70 [ 3653.752748] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.753356] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.753898] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.754596] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140 [ 3653.755125] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.755729] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.756338] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.756794] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.757400] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 [ 3653.757930] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 3653.758437] ? bd_prepare_to_claim+0x129/0x150 [ 3653.758999] ? trace_module_get+0x2b/0xd0 [ 3653.759508] ? try_module_get.part.0+0x50/0x80 [ 3653.760072] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.760661] ? devcgroup_check_permission+0xc1/0x1f0 [ 3653.761288] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.761797] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.762454] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.763055] ? clone_fs_devices+0x8f/0x170 [btrfs] [ 3653.763689] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.764370] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 3653.764922] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.765493] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 [ 3653.766043] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.766780] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.767488] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.767979] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.768548] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.769076] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.769718] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.770381] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.771086] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.771574] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.772136] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.772673] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.773201] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.773793] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.774333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.775094] RIP: 0033:0x7f648bc45aaa This happens because through btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), which is called only during mount, ends up acquiring the mutex open_mutex of a block device while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree while other paths need to acquire other locks before locking extent buffers of the chunk tree. Since at mount time when we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() we know that we don't have other tasks running in parallel and modifying the chunk tree, we can simply skip locking of chunk tree extent buffers. So do that and move the assertion that checks the fs is not yet mounted to the top block of btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), with a comment before doing it. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 54659ca ] when turning off a connection, lockdep complains with the following warning (a modprobe has been done but the same happens with a disconnection from NetworkManager, it's enough to trigger a cfg80211_disconnect call): [ 682.855867] ====================================================== [ 682.855877] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 682.855887] 5.14.0-rc6+ #16 Tainted: G C OE [ 682.855898] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 682.855906] modprobe/1770 is trying to acquire lock: [ 682.855916] ffffb6d000332b00 (&pxmitpriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.856073] but task is already holding lock: [ 682.856081] ffffb6d0003336a8 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x48/0x110 [r8723bs] [ 682.856207] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 682.856215] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 682.856223] -> #1 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}: [ 682.856247] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 [ 682.856265] rtw_get_stainfo+0x9a/0x110 [r8723bs] [ 682.856389] rtw_xmit_classifier+0x27/0x130 [r8723bs] [ 682.856515] rtw_xmitframe_enqueue+0xa/0x20 [r8723bs] [ 682.856642] rtl8723bs_hal_xmit+0x3b/0xb0 [r8723bs] [ 682.856752] rtw_xmit+0x4ef/0x890 [r8723bs] [ 682.856879] _rtw_xmit_entry+0xba/0x350 [r8723bs] [ 682.856981] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xee/0x320 [ 682.856999] sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x330 [ 682.857014] __dev_queue_xmit+0xba5/0xf00 [ 682.857030] packet_sendmsg+0x981/0x1b80 [ 682.857047] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60 [ 682.857060] __sys_sendto+0xf1/0x160 [ 682.857073] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 682.857087] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 682.857102] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 682.857117] -> #0 (&pxmitpriv->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}: [ 682.857142] __lock_acquire+0xfd9/0x1b50 [ 682.857158] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x2c0 [ 682.857172] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 [ 682.857185] rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.857308] rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x53/0x110 [r8723bs] [ 682.857415] cfg80211_rtw_disconnect+0x4b/0x70 [r8723bs] [ 682.857522] cfg80211_disconnect+0x12e/0x2f0 [cfg80211] [ 682.857759] cfg80211_leave+0x2b/0x40 [cfg80211] [ 682.857961] cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0xa9/0x560 [cfg80211] [ 682.858163] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x50 [ 682.858180] __dev_close_many+0x62/0x100 [ 682.858195] dev_close_many+0x7d/0x120 [ 682.858209] unregister_netdevice_many+0x416/0x680 [ 682.858225] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xab/0xf0 [ 682.858240] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [ 682.858255] rtw_unregister_netdevs+0x28/0x40 [r8723bs] [ 682.858360] rtw_dev_remove+0x24/0xd0 [r8723bs] [ 682.858463] sdio_bus_remove+0x31/0xd0 [mmc_core] [ 682.858532] device_release_driver_internal+0xf7/0x1d0 [ 682.858550] driver_detach+0x47/0x90 [ 682.858564] bus_remove_driver+0x77/0xd0 [ 682.858579] rtw_drv_halt+0xc/0x678 [r8723bs] [ 682.858685] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13f/0x250 [ 682.858699] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 682.858715] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 682.858729] other info that might help us debug this: [ 682.858737] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 682.858744] CPU0 CPU1 [ 682.858751] ---- ---- [ 682.858758] lock(&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock); [ 682.858772] lock(&pxmitpriv->lock); [ 682.858786] lock(&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock); [ 682.858799] lock(&pxmitpriv->lock); [ 682.858812] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 682.858820] 5 locks held by modprobe/1770: [ 682.858831] #0: ffff8d870697d980 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x1a/0x1d0 [ 682.858869] #1: ffffffffbdbbf1c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20 [ 682.858906] #2: ffff8d87054ee5e8 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x9e/0x560 [cfg80211] [ 682.859131] #3: ffff8d870f2bc8f0 (&wdev->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cfg80211_leave+0x20/0x40 [cfg80211] [ 682.859354] #4: ffffb6d0003336a8 (&pstapriv->sta_hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x48/0x110 [r8723bs] [ 682.859482] stack backtrace: [ 682.859491] CPU: 1 PID: 1770 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G C OE 5.14.0-rc6+ #16 [ 682.859507] Hardware name: LENOVO 80NR/Madrid, BIOS DACN25WW 08/20/2015 [ 682.859517] Call Trace: [ 682.859531] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x6f [ 682.859551] check_noncircular+0xdb/0xf0 [ 682.859579] __lock_acquire+0xfd9/0x1b50 [ 682.859606] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x2c0 [ 682.859623] ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.859752] ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0x70 [ 682.859769] ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x4a/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.859898] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 [ 682.859914] ? rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.860039] rtw_free_stainfo+0x52/0x4a0 [r8723bs] [ 682.860171] rtw_free_assoc_resources+0x53/0x110 [r8723bs] [ 682.860286] cfg80211_rtw_disconnect+0x4b/0x70 [r8723bs] [ 682.860397] cfg80211_disconnect+0x12e/0x2f0 [cfg80211] [ 682.860629] cfg80211_leave+0x2b/0x40 [cfg80211] [ 682.860836] cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0xa9/0x560 [cfg80211] [ 682.861048] ? __lock_acquire+0x4dc/0x1b50 [ 682.861070] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa8/0x110 [ 682.861089] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa8/0x110 [ 682.861104] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 [ 682.861120] ? packet_notifier+0x173/0x300 [ 682.861141] ? lock_release+0xb3/0x250 [ 682.861160] ? packet_notifier+0x192/0x300 [ 682.861184] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x41/0x50 [ 682.861205] __dev_close_many+0x62/0x100 [ 682.861224] dev_close_many+0x7d/0x120 [ 682.861245] unregister_netdevice_many+0x416/0x680 [ 682.861264] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 [ 682.861284] unregister_netdevice_queue+0xab/0xf0 [ 682.861306] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [ 682.861325] rtw_unregister_netdevs+0x28/0x40 [r8723bs] [ 682.861434] rtw_dev_remove+0x24/0xd0 [r8723bs] [ 682.861542] sdio_bus_remove+0x31/0xd0 [mmc_core] [ 682.861615] device_release_driver_internal+0xf7/0x1d0 [ 682.861637] driver_detach+0x47/0x90 [ 682.861656] bus_remove_driver+0x77/0xd0 [ 682.861674] rtw_drv_halt+0xc/0x678 [r8723bs] [ 682.861782] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13f/0x250 [ 682.861801] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xf3/0x170 [ 682.861817] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x70 [ 682.861836] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 682.861855] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 682.861873] RIP: 0033:0x7f6dbe85400b [ 682.861890] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 1e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3d 1e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 682.861906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe7a82f538 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 [ 682.861923] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a64693bd20 RCX: 00007f6dbe85400b [ 682.861935] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055a64693bd88 [ 682.861946] RBP: 000055a64693bd20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 682.861957] R10: 00007f6dbe8c7ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055a64693bd88 [ 682.861967] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055a64693bd88 R15: 00007ffe7a831848 This happens because when we enqueue a frame for transmission we do it under xmit_priv lock, then calling rtw_get_stainfo (needed for enqueuing) takes sta_hash_lock and this leads to the following lock dependency: xmit_priv->lock -> sta_hash_lock Turning off a connection will bring to call rtw_free_assoc_resources which will set up the inverse dependency: sta_hash_lock -> xmit_priv_lock This could lead to a deadlock as lockdep complains. Fix it by removing the xmit_priv->lock around rtw_xmitframe_enqueue call inside rtl8723bs_hal_xmit and put it in a smaller critical section inside rtw_xmit_classifier, the only place where xmit_priv data are actually accessed. Replace spin_{lock,unlock}_bh(pxmitpriv->lock) in other tx paths leading to rtw_xmitframe_enqueue call with spin_{lock,unlock}_bh(psta->sleep_q.lock) - it's not clear why accessing a sleep_q was protected by a spinlock on xmitpriv->lock. This way is avoided the same faulty lock nesting order. Extra changes in v2 by Hans de Goede: -Lift the taking of the struct __queue.lock spinlock out of rtw_free_xmitframe_queue() into the callers this allows also protecting a bunch of related state in rtw_free_stainfo(): -Protect psta->sleepq_len on rtw_free_xmitframe_queue(&psta->sleep_q); -Protect struct tx_servq.tx_pending and tx_servq.qcnt when calling rtw_free_xmitframe_queue(&tx_servq.sta_pending) -This also allows moving the spin_lock_bh(&pxmitpriv->lock); to below the sleep_q free-ing code, avoiding another ABBA locking issue CC: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Co-developed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Tested-on: Lenovo Ideapad MiiX 300-10IBY Signed-off-by: Fabio Aiuto <fabioaiuto83@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210920145502.155454-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

There are cases that the TSC clocksource is wrongly judged as unstable by the clocksource watchdog mechanism which tries to validate the TSC against HPET, PM_TIMER or jiffies. While there is hardly a general reliable way to check the validity of a watchdog, Thomas Gleixner proposed [1]: "I'm inclined to lift that requirement when the CPU has: 1) X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC 2) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC 3) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 4) X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST 5) At max. 4 sockets After two decades of horrors we're finally at a point where TSC seems to be halfway reliable and less abused by BIOS tinkerers. TSC_ADJUST was really key as we can now detect even small modifications reliably and the important point is that we can cure them as well (not pretty but better than all other options)." As feature #3 X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 only exists on several generations of Atom processorz, and is always coupled with X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC and X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, skip checking it, and also be more defensive to use maximal 2 sockets. The check is done inside tsc_init() before registering 'tsc-early' and 'tsc' clocksources, as there were cases that both of them had been wrongly judged as unreliable. For more background of tsc/watchdog, there is a good summary in [2] [tglx} Update vs. jiffies: On systems where the only remaining clocksource aside of TSC is jiffies there is no way to make this work because that creates a circular dependency. Jiffies accuracy depends on not missing a periodic timer interrupt, which is not guaranteed. That could be detected by TSC, but as TSC is not trusted this cannot be compensated. The consequence is a circulus vitiosus which results in shutting down TSC and falling back to the jiffies clocksource which is even more unreliable. [1]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87eekfk8bd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/ [2]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87a6pimt1f.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/ [ tglx: Refine comment and amend changelog ] Fixes: 6e3cd95 ("x86/hpet: Use another crystalball to evaluate HPET usability") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117023751.24190-2-feng.tang@intel.com

When branch target identifiers are in use, code reachable via an indirect branch requires a BTI landing pad at the branch target site. When building FTRACE_WITH_REGS atop patchable-function-entry, we miss BTIs at the start start of the `ftrace_caller` and `ftrace_regs_caller` trampolines, and when these are called from a module via a PLT (which will use a `BR X16`), we will encounter a BTI failure, e.g. | # insmod lkdtm.ko | lkdtm: No crash points registered, enable through debugfs | # echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer | # cat /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT | Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x34000001 -- BTI | CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 60400405 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=jc) | pc : ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c | lr : lkdtm_debugfs_open+0xc/0x20 [lkdtm] | sp : ffff800012e43b00 | x29: ffff800012e43b00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff800012e43c88 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c171f200 | x23: ffff0000c27b1e00 x22: ffff0000c2265240 x21: ffff0000c23c8c30 | x20: ffff8000090ba380 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80001002bb4c x15: 0000000000000000 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000900ff0 | x11: ffff0000c4166310 x10: ffff800012e43b00 x9 : ffff8000104f2384 | x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f | x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff800012e43af0 x3 : 0000000000000001 | x2 : ffff8000090b0000 x1 : ffff0000c171f200 x0 : ffff0000c23c8c30 | Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception | CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a4 | show_stack+0x24/0x30 | dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 | dump_stack+0x1c/0x38 | panic+0x168/0x360 | arm64_exit_nmi.isra.0+0x0/0x80 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xd4 | el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c | ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c | do_dentry_open+0x134/0x3b0 | vfs_open+0x38/0x44 | path_openat+0x89c/0xe40 | do_filp_open+0x8c/0x13c | do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x174 | __arm64_sys_openat+0x6c/0xbc | invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100 | do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0 | el0_svc+0x28/0x80 | el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130 | el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 | SMP: stopping secondary CPUs | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x0,00000f42,da660c5f | Memory Limit: none | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception ]--- Fix this by adding the required `BTI C`, as we only require these to be reachable via BL for direct calls or BR X16/X17 for PLTs. For now, these are open-coded in the function prologue, matching the style of the `__hwasan_tag_mismatch` trampoline. In future we may wish to consider adding a new SYM_CODE_START_*() variant which has an implicit BTI. When ftrace is built atop mcount, the trampolines are marked with SYM_FUNC_START(), and so get an implicit BTI. We may need to change these over to SYM_CODE_START() in future for RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, in case we need to apply special care aroud the return address being rewritten. Fixes: 97fed77 ("arm64: bti: Provide Kconfig for kernel mode BTI") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129135709.2274019-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4d9380e ] Often some test cases like btrfs/161 trigger lockdep splats that complain about possible unsafe lock scenario due to the fact that during mount, when reading the chunk tree we end up calling blkdev_get_by_path() while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree. That produces a lockdep splat like the following: [ 3653.683975] ====================================================== [ 3653.685148] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3653.686301] 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 Not tainted [ 3653.687239] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3653.688400] mount/447465 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3653.689320] ffff8c6b0c76e528 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.691054] but task is already holding lock: [ 3653.692155] ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.693978] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3653.695510] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3653.696915] -> #3 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3653.698053] down_read_nested+0x4b/0x140 [ 3653.698893] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.699988] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 [btrfs] [ 3653.701205] btrfs_search_slot+0x537/0xc00 [btrfs] [ 3653.702234] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x32/0x70 [btrfs] [ 3653.703332] btrfs_init_new_device+0x563/0x15b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.704439] btrfs_ioctl+0x2110/0x3530 [btrfs] [ 3653.705405] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.706215] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.706990] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.708040] -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3653.708994] lock_release+0x13d/0x4a0 [ 3653.709533] up_write+0x18/0x160 [ 3653.710017] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x5b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.710699] __loop_update_dio+0xbd/0x170 [loop] [ 3653.711360] lo_ioctl+0x3b1/0x8a0 [loop] [ 3653.711929] block_ioctl+0x48/0x50 [ 3653.712442] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.712991] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.713519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.714233] -> #1 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.715026] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.715648] lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] [ 3653.716275] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0x90 [ 3653.716867] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x142/0x320 [ 3653.717537] blkdev_open+0x5e/0xa0 [ 3653.718043] do_dentry_open+0x163/0x390 [ 3653.718604] path_openat+0x3f0/0xa80 [ 3653.719128] do_filp_open+0xa9/0x150 [ 3653.719652] do_sys_openat2+0x97/0x160 [ 3653.720197] __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 [ 3653.720766] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.721285] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.721986] -> #0 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.722775] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.723348] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.723867] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.724394] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.725041] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.725614] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726332] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726999] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.727739] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.728384] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.729130] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.729676] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.730192] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.730800] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.731427] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.731970] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.732486] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.732997] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.733560] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.734080] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.734782] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3653.735784] Chain exists of: &disk->open_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-chunk-00 [ 3653.737123] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3653.737865] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3653.738435] ---- ---- [ 3653.739007] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.739449] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 3653.740193] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.740955] lock(&disk->open_mutex); [ 3653.741431] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3653.742176] 3 locks held by mount/447465: [ 3653.742739] #0: ffff8c6acf85c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xd5/0x3b0 [ 3653.744114] #1: ffffffffc0b28f70 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x59/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.745563] #2: ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.747066] stack backtrace: [ 3653.747723] CPU: 4 PID: 447465 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 [ 3653.748873] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3653.750592] Call Trace: [ 3653.750967] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 [ 3653.751526] check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 [ 3653.752136] ? stack_trace_save+0x4b/0x70 [ 3653.752748] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.753356] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.753898] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.754596] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140 [ 3653.755125] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.755729] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.756338] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.756794] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.757400] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 [ 3653.757930] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 3653.758437] ? bd_prepare_to_claim+0x129/0x150 [ 3653.758999] ? trace_module_get+0x2b/0xd0 [ 3653.759508] ? try_module_get.part.0+0x50/0x80 [ 3653.760072] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.760661] ? devcgroup_check_permission+0xc1/0x1f0 [ 3653.761288] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.761797] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.762454] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.763055] ? clone_fs_devices+0x8f/0x170 [btrfs] [ 3653.763689] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.764370] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 3653.764922] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.765493] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 [ 3653.766043] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.766780] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.767488] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.767979] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.768548] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.769076] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.769718] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.770381] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.771086] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.771574] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.772136] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.772673] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.773201] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.773793] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.774333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.775094] RIP: 0033:0x7f648bc45aaa This happens because through btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), which is called only during mount, ends up acquiring the mutex open_mutex of a block device while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree while other paths need to acquire other locks before locking extent buffers of the chunk tree. Since at mount time when we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() we know that we don't have other tasks running in parallel and modifying the chunk tree, we can simply skip locking of chunk tree extent buffers. So do that and move the assertion that checks the fs is not yet mounted to the top block of btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), with a comment before doing it. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

huanfeng-sf and others added 29 commits May 1, 2021 14:50

gpio: starfive-vic: Add /proc/vic_gpio entry

b18ca00

drivers/tty/serial/8250: update driver for VIC7100

5451556

drivers/hw_random: Add Starfive VIC Random Number Generator driver

0bed25b

drivers/hwmon: Add tempsensor hwmon driver for Starfive VIC7100

c7cb0ff

sifive/sifive_l2_cache: Add sifive_l2_flush64_range function

829699c

sifive/sifive_l2_cache: Add Starfive support

b42ef17

sifive/sifive_l2_cache: Add disabling IRQ option (workaround)

1d28769

drivers/pwm: Add SiFive PWM PTC driver

7a968fc

drivers/pwm/pwm-sifive-ptc: Clear PWM CNTR

e18d3d8

Clear CNTR of PWM after setting period & duty_cycle

drivers/dma: Add dw-axi-dmac-starfive driver for VIC7100

0611822

drivers/i2c: Improve Synopsys DesignWare I2C adapter driver for StarF…

ec97c2e

…ive VIC7100

drivers/i2c: Add GPIO configuration for VIC7100.

f669b02

[FIXME] why we can not do it in U-boot?

drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro: Add dcache flush functions for VIC7100

6fbc2c0

Note: including uSDK v0.9->v1.0 patch

drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac: configure gtxclk based on speed

39a68aa

drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc: Add dcache flush(VIC7100 ONLY).

ca96134

drivers/usb: Add dcache flush(VIC7100 ONLY)

1c59fed

drivers/usb/cdns3/ drivers/usb/core/ drivers/usb/host/ include/linux/usb.h

riscv/starfive: Add VIC7100 support

503499b

drivers/video/fbdev and drivers/media/platform: starfive drivers added

29cf370

1, add ov5640&sc2235 drivers, update stf_isp 2, add MIPI/CSI/DSI drivers for VIC7100

drivers/media and video: update fb driver(flush cache) and cam sensor…

855e9ec

… drivers

drivers/video/fbdev/starfive: workaround for unavailable pointer of dtb

5972c7d

Fix sf_fb_map_video_memory in starfive_fb.c

drivers/video/fbdev/starfive: fix compiler warnings

cd67d0f

Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

drivers/video/fbdev/starfive: improve error handling

9d3de4c

Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

spi: cadence-quadspi: Allow compilation on RISC-V

15df77b

This IP is also used on the Starfive JH7100 riscv64 SoC and presumable also the upcoming JH7110 SoC. Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

power: reset: Add TPS65086 restart driver

3f82ffa

Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk>

riscv: dts: starfive: jh7100: Refer to labels from aliases

bade763

Let the aliases refer to device nodes using their labels, instead of absolute paths. Fixes: 3ca5133 ("riscv: dts: Add JH7100 and BeagleV Starlight support") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>

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riscv: dts: starfive: jh7100: Refer to labels from aliases#3

riscv: dts: starfive: jh7100: Refer to labels from aliases#3
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geertu commented May 11, 2021

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