If you find a security issue in QuickSheet, please email cemheren@gmail.com rather than opening a public issue. I'll respond within a week.
Useful things to include:
- A short description of the issue.
- Steps to reproduce (a CSV, a key sequence, a specific platform).
- Whether the issue is exploitable from a normal user session or requires special privileges.
QuickSheet is a desktop side project that runs as the current user. The threat model is narrow:
- In scope: flaws that let an unprivileged process or a hostile CSV escalate to running arbitrary commands as the QuickSheet user (e.g. cell-value parsing bugs that lead to unintended subprocess execution), or that bypass the explicit
r:/i:/ext:opt-ins. - Also in scope: flaws in the extension protocol (manifest parsing, JSON-line handling, subprocess lifecycle) that could let a malicious extension repo affect QuickSheet beyond what its own subprocess can do.
- Out of scope: what a
r:ori:cell does once the user has activated it — those prefixes deliberately run arbitrary commands. Likewiseext: github:user/repodeliberately clones and executes a remote repo. Treat extensions like any other software yougit clone && run. - Out of scope: vulnerabilities in third-party APIs that extensions happen to call.
QuickSheet's core has zero NuGet dependencies as a deliberate policy. Supply-chain vulnerabilities in third-party packages are not a concern for the core. Reference extensions follow the same rule.
After a fix lands, I'll credit the reporter (with their consent) in the release notes and in the relevant commit message.